E5P20S
Scholium — Part V
Latin
Possumus hoc eodem modo ostendere nullum dari affectum qui huic amori directe sit contrarius, a quo hic ipse amor possit destrui atque adeo concludere possumus hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum est constantissimum nec quatenus ad corpus refertur, posse destrui nisi cum ipso corpore. Cujus autem naturæ sit quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, postea videbimus. Atque his omnia affectuum remedia sive id omne quod mens in se sola considerata adversus affectus potest, comprehendi; ex quibus apparet mentis in affectus potentiam consistere I° in ipsa affectuum cognitione (vide scholium propositionis 4 hujus). II° in eo quod affectus a cogitatione causæ externæ quam confuse imaginamur, separat (vide propositionem 2 cum eodem scholio propositionis 4 hujus). III° in tempore quo affectiones quæ ad res quas intelligimus referuntur, illas superant quæ ad res referuntur quas confuse seu mutilate concipimus (vide propositionem 7 hujus). IV° in multitudine causarum a quibus affectiones quæ ad rerum communes proprietates vel ad Deum referuntur, foventur (vide propositiones 9 et 11 hujus). V° denique in ordine quo mens suos affectus ordinare et invicem concatenare potest (vide scholium propositionis 10 et insuper propositiones 12, 13 et 14 hujus). Sed ut hæc mentis in affectus potentia melius intelligatur, venit apprime notandum quod affectus a nobis magni appellantur quando unius hominis affectum cum affectu alterius comparamus et unum magis quam alium eodem affectu conflictari videmus; vel quando unius ejusdemque hominis affectus ad invicem comparamus eundemque uno affectu magis quam alio affici sive moveri comperimus. Nam (per propositionem 5 partis IV) vis cujuscunque affectus definitur potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata. At mentis potentia sola cognitione definitur; impotentia autem seu passio a sola cognitionis privatione hoc est ab eo per quod ideæ dicuntur inadæquatæ, æstimatur; ex quo sequitur mentem illam maxime pati cujus maximam partem ideæ inadæquatæ constituunt ita ut magis per id quod patitur quam per id quod agit dignoscatur et illam contra maxime agere cujus maximam partem ideæ adæquatæ constituunt ita ut quamvis huic tot inadæquatæ ideæ quam illi insint, magis tamen per illas quæ humanæ virtuti tribuuntur quam per has quæ humanam impotentiam arguunt, dignoscatur. Deinde notandum animi ægritudines et infortunia potissimum originem trahere ex nimio amore erga rem quæ multis variationibus est obnoxia et cujus nunquam compotes esse possumus. Nam nemo de re ulla nisi quam amat sollicitus anxiusve est neque injuriæ, suspiciones, inimicitiæ etc. oriuntur nisi ex amore erga res quarum nemo potest revera esse compos. Ex his itaque facile concipimus quid clara et distincta cognitio et præcipue tertium illud cognitionis genus (de quo vide scholium propositionis 47 partis II) cujus fundamentum est ipsa Dei cognitio, in affectus potest quos nempe quatenus passiones sunt, si non absolute tollit (vide propositionem 3 cum scholio propositionis 4 hujus) saltem efficit ut minimam mentis partem constituant (vide propositionem 14 hujus). Deinde amorem gignit erga rem immutabilem et æternam (vide propositionem 15 hujus) et cujus revera sumus compotes (vide propositionem 45 partis II) et qui propterea nullis vitiis quæ in communi amore insunt, inquinari sed semper major ac major esse potest (per propositionem 15 hujus) et mentis maximam partem occupare (per propositionem 16 hujus) lateque afficere. Atque his omnia quæ præsentem hanc vitam spectant, absolvi. Nam quod in hujus scholii principio dixi me his paucis omnia affectuum remedia amplexum esse, facile poterit unusquisque videre qui ad hæc quæ in hoc scholio diximus et simul ad mentis ejusque affectuum definitiones et denique ad propositiones 1 et 3 partis III attenderit. Tempus igitur jam est ut ad illa transeam quæ ad mentis durationem sine relatione ad corpus pertinent.
English (Elwes 1883)
We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:----
Modern English
We can show in the same way that there is no affect directly contrary to this love by which this love could be destroyed. From this we conclude that this love toward God is the most constant of all affects, and that, insofar as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed except with the body itself. What its nature is insofar as it is referred to the mind alone, we will see presently.
With this, all the remedies against the affects, that is, everything the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them, have been covered. The mind's power over the affects consists in: I. Knowledge of the affects themselves (E5P4S). II. The separation of the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we confusedly imagine (E5P2). III. The time in which the affections related to things we understand surpass those related to things we conceive confusedly or in a fragmentary way (E5P7). IV. The abundance of causes by which affections related to the common properties of things or to God are nourished (E5P9). V. The order in which the mind can arrange and interconnect its affects (E5P10S).
To understand the mind's power over the affects better, we should note first that affects are called great when we compare one person's affect with another's and find that one is more troubled by the same affect than the other; or when we compare one and the same person's affects with each other and find that the person is more strongly moved or affected by one affect than by another. For (E4P5) the strength of any affect is defined by the power of the external cause compared with our own. But the mind's power is defined by knowledge alone; its weakness, or passion, is estimated solely by the privation of knowledge, that is, by what makes ideas be called inadequate. From this it follows that the mind that is mostly composed of inadequate ideas suffers most, so that it is known more by what it undergoes than by what it does; whereas the mind whose greatest part is composed of adequate ideas acts most, so that even if it contains as many inadequate ideas as the other, it is still known more by those qualities that attest to human virtue than by those that attest to human weakness.
We should also note that distress of mind and misfortune take their origin chiefly from excessive love toward a thing that is subject to many variations and that we can never possess. For no one is anxious or troubled about anything except what they love; and injuries, suspicions, enmities, and so on arise only from love toward things that no one can truly possess.
From this we can easily grasp what clear and distinct knowledge — and especially that third kind of knowledge (E2P40S2), whose foundation is knowledge of God itself — can do against the affects: it cannot absolutely remove them insofar as they are passions (E5P3), but it brings it about that they occupy the smallest part of the mind (E5P14). It also gives rise to a love toward a thing that is immutable and eternal (E5P15), a thing of which we can truly be in possession (E2P45), and which for that reason can be tainted by none of the faults found in ordinary love, but can always grow greater and greater (E5P15), and can occupy the greatest part of the mind (E5P16) and affect it widely.
With this, everything pertaining to the present life is concluded. Anyone who attends both to what has been said in this scholium and to the definitions of the mind and its affects, and also to propositions 1 and 3 of Part 3, will easily see that I have here encompassed all the remedies against the affects. The time has come to move to those matters that concern the mind's duration without relation to the body.