E2P47S
Scholium — Part II
Latin
Hinc videmus Dei infinitam essentiam ejusque æternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere quæ adæquate cognoscamus atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare de quo diximus in scholio II propositionis 40 hujus partis et de cujus præstantia et utilitate in quinta parte erit nobis dicendi locus. Quod autem homines non æque claram Dei ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora et quod nomen "Deus" junxerunt imaginibus rerum quas videre solent; quod homines vix vitare possunt quia continuo a corporibus externis afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait lineas quæ ex centro circuli ad ejusdem circumferentiam ducuntur esse inæquales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit quam mathematici. Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare quem nuper audivi clamantem suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur. Atque hinc pleræque oriuntur controversiæ nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur. Nam revera dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant ita ut quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.
English (Elwes 1883)
Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
Modern English
From this we see that the infinite essence of God and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that from this knowledge we can deduce many things we know adequately, and so form that third kind of knowledge of which I spoke in the second scholium of P40 of this Part, and of whose excellence and usefulness I will have occasion to speak in Part 5.
That men do not have equally clear knowledge of God as they do of common notions comes from the fact that they cannot imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with images of the things they normally see, something men can barely avoid, since they are continuously affected by external bodies. And indeed most errors reduce to this alone: that we do not apply names to things correctly. When someone says that the lines drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he surely understands by circle something different from what mathematicians understand. So too when people err in calculation, they have one set of numbers in their mind and another on paper. If you look into their mind, they are not really erring; they only appear to err because we assume they have in mind the numbers that are on paper. If that were not so, we would not believe them to err, just as I did not think a man was erring whom I recently heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbor's hen-house, for his meaning seemed clear enough to me. And from this most controversies arise: namely, because people do not explain their own meaning correctly, or do not correctly interpret the meaning of another. For in truth, while they seem to contradict each other most flatly, they are either thinking the same thing or thinking different things, so that what they take to be errors and absurdities in one another are not.