E5P10S

Scholium — Part V

Latin

Hac potestate recte ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones efficere possumus ut non facile malis affectibus afficiamur. Nam (per propositionem 7 hujus) major vis requiritur ad affectus secundum ordinem ad intellectum ordinatos et concatenatos coercendum quam incertos et vagos. Optimum igitur quod efficere possumus quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est rectam vivendi rationem seu certa vitæ dogmata concipere eaque memoriæ mandare et rebus particularibus in vita frequenter obviis continuo applicare ut sic nostra imaginatio late iisdem afficiatur et nobis in promptu sint semper. Exempli gratia inter vitæ dogmata posuimus (vide propositionem 46 partis IV cum ejusdem scholio) odium amore seu generositate vincendum, non autem reciproco odio compensandum. Ut autem hoc rationis præscriptum semper in promptu habeamus ubi usus erit, cogitandæ et sæpe meditandæ sunt communes hominum injuriæ et quomodo et qua via generositate optime propulsentur; sic enim imaginem injuriæ imaginationi hujus dogmatis jungemus et nobis (per propositionem 18 partis II) in promptu semper erit ubi nobis injuria afferetur. Quod si etiam in promptu habuerimus rationem nostri veri utilis ac etiam boni quod ex mutua amicitia et communi societate sequitur et præterea quod ex recta vivendi ratione summa animi acquiescentia oriatur (per propositionem 52 partis IV) et quod homines ut reliqua, ex naturæ necessitate agant, tum injuria sive odium quod ex eadem oriri solet, minimam imaginationis partem occupabit et facile superabitur; vel si ira quæ ex maximis injuriis oriri solet, non adeo facile superetur, superabitur tamen quamvis non sine animi fluctuatione, longe minore temporis spatio quam si hæc non ita præmeditata habuissemus, ut patet ex propositione 6, 7 et 8 hujus partis. De animositate ad metum deponendum eodem modo cogitandum est; enumeranda scilicet sunt et sæpe imaginanda communia vitæ pericula et quomodo animi præsentia et fortitudine optime vitari et superari possunt. Sed notandum quod nobis in ordinandis nostris cogitationibus et imaginibus semper attendendum est (per corollarium propositionis 63 partis IV et propositionem 59 partis III) ad illa quæ in unaquaque re bona sunt ut sic semper ex lætitiæ affectu ad agendum determinemur. Exempli gratia si quis videt se nimis gloriam sectari, de ejus recto usu cogitet et in quem finem sectanda sit et quibus mediis acquiri possit sed non de ipsius abusu et vanitate et hominum inconstantia vel aliis hujusmodi de quibus nemo nisi ex animi ægritudine cogitat; talibus enim cogitationibus maxime ambitiosi se maxime afflictant quando de assequendo honore quem ambiunt desperant et dum iram evomunt, sapientes videri volunt. Quare certum est eos gloriæ maxime esse cupidos qui de ipsius abusu et mundi vanitate maxime clamant. Nec hoc ambitiosis proprium sed omnibus commune est quibus fortuna est adversa et qui animo impotentes sunt. Nam pauper etiam, avarus de abusu pecuniæ et divitum vitiis non cessat loqui, quo nihil aliud efficit quam se afflictare et aliis ostendere se non tantum paupertatem suam sed etiam aliorum divitias iniquo animo ferre. Sic etiam qui male ab amasia excepti sunt, nihil aliud cogitant quam de mulierum inconstantia et fallaci animo et reliquis earundem decantatis vitiis quæ omnia statim oblivioni tradunt simulac ab amasia iterum recipiuntur. Qui itaque suos affectus et appetitus ex solo libertatis amore moderari studet, is quantum potest nitetur virtutes earumque causas noscere et animum gaudio quod ex earum vera cognitione oritur, implere; at minime hominum vitia contemplari hominesque obtrectare et falsa libertatis specie gaudere. Atque hæc qui diligenter observabit (neque enim difficilia sunt) et exercebit, næ ille brevi temporis spatio actiones suas ex rationis imperio plerumque dirigere poterit.

English (Elwes 1883)

By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.

[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.

Modern English

By this power of rightly arranging and connecting the body's affections we can guard ourselves against being easily struck by bad affects. For (E5P7) greater force is needed to restrain affects that are arranged and connected according to the intellectual order than to restrain those that are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can therefore do, as long as we lack a perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a sound rule of living, some fixed maxims of life, to commit these to memory and apply them continually to the particular things we often encounter in life, so that our imagination may be thoroughly saturated with them and have them always at hand.

For instance, we laid down among the rules of life (E4P46S) that hatred is to be overcome by love or by generosity, and not repaid with hatred in return. Now, so that this dictate of reason may always be at hand when needed, we should think through and often reflect on the common wrongs done by people, and on how and by what means they can best be repelled by generosity. By doing this we join the image of a wrong to this maxim, and it will always be at hand (E2P18) when a wrong is done to us. If we also keep ready the thought of our true advantage and of the good that follows from mutual friendship and common fellowship; if we remember too that the highest contentment of mind arises from a sound way of living (E4P52) and that people, like everything else, act from the necessity of nature, then the wrong or the hatred that usually arises from it will occupy a very small part of the imagination and will easily be overcome. Or if the anger that usually arises from the most serious wrongs is not overcome so easily, it will nonetheless be overcome, though not without some inner conflict, in far less time than if we had not thought these things through beforehand, as is evident from E5P6, E5P7, and E5P8 (E5P6).

We should think about courage in the same way, as a means of putting aside fear: the common dangers of life should be enumerated and often imagined, along with how they can best be avoided and overcome through presence of mind and strength of character. But it should be noted that in arranging our thoughts and images we must always attend (E4P63C) to what is good in each thing (E3P59), so that we are always determined to act from an affect of joy. For instance, if someone sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think about its right use, toward what end it is to be sought and by what means it can be acquired, and not about its misuse and emptiness and the inconstancy of people, or other things of that kind that no one thinks about except from a sickness of mind. For it is by such thoughts that the most ambitious torment themselves most, when they despair of gaining the honour they crave, and while venting their anger they wish to appear wise. So it is certain that those who cry loudest about the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world are those most greedy for it.

This is not peculiar to the ambitious — it is common to everyone whom fortune has treated badly and who are weak in spirit. A poor miser too never stops talking about the misuse of money and the vices of the rich, and by this he accomplishes nothing except to torment himself and to show others that he bears his own poverty and others' wealth alike with an ill will. In the same way, those badly received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy and treachery of women and their other much-talked-about faults, all of which they immediately forget the moment she takes them back.

So one who strives to govern his affects and desires solely from love of freedom will try, as much as he can, to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the joy that arises from their true knowledge. He will by no means wish to dwell on people's faults, or to belittle his fellows, or to take pleasure in a false semblance of freedom. Whoever carefully observes and practises these precepts, and they are not difficult, will in a short time be able, for the most part, to direct his actions by the command of reason.

Depends on (8)

Depended on by (1)

Scholia