E5P4S
Scholium — Part V
Latin
Quandoquidem nihil datur ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur (per propositionem 36 partis I) et quicquid ex idea quæ in nobis est adæquata, sequitur, id omne clare et distincte intelligimus (per propositionem 40 partis II) hinc sequitur unumquemque potestatem habere se suosque affectus, si non absolute, ex parte saltem clare et distincte intelligendi et consequenter efficiendi ut ab iisdem minus patiatur. Huic igitur rei præcipue danda est opera ut unumquemque affectum quantum fieri potest clare et distincte cognoscamus ut sic mens ex affectu ad illa cogitandum determinetur quæ clare et distincte percipit et in quibus plane acquiescit atque adeo ut ipse affectus a cogitatione causæ externæ separetur et veris jungatur cogitationibus; ex quo fiet ut non tantum amor, odium etc. destruantur (per propositionem 2 hujus) sed ut etiam appetitus seu cupiditates quæ ex tali affectu oriri solent, excessum habere nequeant (per propositionem 61 partis IV). Nam apprime notandum est unum eundemque esse appetitum per quem homo tam agere quam pati dicitur. Exempli gratia cum natura humana ita comparatum esse ostendimus ut unusquisque appetat ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant (vide corollarium propositionis 31 partis III) qui quidem appetitus in homine qui ratione non ducitur, passio est quæ ambitio vocatur nec multum a superbia discrepat et contra in homine qui ex rationis dictamine vivit, actio seu virtus est quæ pietas appellatur (vide scholium I propositionis 37 partis IV et II demonstrationem ejusdem propositionis). Et hoc modo omnes appetitus seu cupiditates eatenus tantum passiones sunt quatenus ex ideis inadæquatis oriuntur atque eædem virtuti accensentur quando ab ideis adæquatis excitantur vel generantur. Nam omnes cupiditates quibus ad aliquid agendum determinamur, tam oriri possunt ab adæquatis quam ab inadæquatis ideis (vide propositionem 59 partis IV). Atque hoc (ut eo unde digressus sum revertar) affectuum remedio quod scilicet in eorum vera cognitione consistit, nullum præstantius aliud quod a nostra potestate pendeat, excogitari potest quandoquidem nulla alia mentis potentia datur quam cogitandi et adæquatas ideas formandi, ut supra (per propositionem 3 partis III) ostendimus.
English (Elwes 1883)
Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III. iii.).
Modern English
Since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow (E1P36), and since we clearly and distinctly understand everything that follows from an idea that is adequate in us (E2P40), it follows that each person has the power to understand clearly and distinctly, if not absolutely, then at least in part, both themselves and their affects, and consequently to bring it about that they suffer less from those affects. We must therefore direct our chief effort to knowing each affect as clearly and distinctly as possible, so that the mind may be led by the affect to think about those things it perceives clearly and distinctly, and in which it fully rests. And so the affect itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts (E5P2). The result will be not only that love, hatred, and the like are destroyed (E5P2), but also that the desires arising from such affects will be incapable of excess (E4P61).
For it should especially be noted that the appetite by which a person is said to act and the appetite by which the same person is said to suffer is one and the same. To illustrate: we showed that human nature is so constituted that each person desires the others to live according to their own character (E3P31C). In a person not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion called ambition, which does not differ much from pride. In a person who lives by reason's dictates, it is an action — a virtue — called piety (E4P37S1). And in this way all appetites or desires are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas, and they are credited to virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires by which we are determined to act can arise equally from adequate and from inadequate ideas (E4P59).
To return to the point from which I digressed: no remedy for the affects that lies within our power is more excellent than this one, that is, the true knowledge of them, since no other power of the mind exists except the power to think and to form adequate ideas, as we showed above (E3P3).