E4P37S1
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Qui ex solo affectu conatur ut reliqui ament quod ipse amat et ut reliqui ex suo ingenio vivant, solo impetu agit et ideo odiosus est præcipue iis quibus alia placent quique propterea etiam student et eodem impetu conantur ut reliqui contra ex ipsorum ingenio vivant. Deinde quoniam summum quod homines ex affectu appetunt bonum sæpe tale est ut unus tantum ejus possit esse compos, hinc fit ut qui amant mente sibi non constent et dum laudes rei quam amant narrare gaudent, timeant credi. At qui reliquos conatur ratione ducere, non impetu sed humaniter et benigne agit et sibi mente maxime constat. Porro quicquid cupimus et agimus cujus causa sumus quatenus Dei habemus ideam sive quatenus Deum cognoscimus, ad religionem refero. Cupiditatem autem bene faciendi quæ eo ingeneratur quod ex rationis ductu vivimus, pietatem voco. Cupiditatem deinde qua homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit, tenetur ut reliquos sibi amicitia jungat, honestatem voco et id honestum quod homines qui ex ductu rationis vivunt, laudant et id contra turpe quod conciliandæ amicitiæ repugnat. Præter hæc civitatis etiam quænam sint fundamenta ostendi. Differentia deinde inter veram virtutem et impotentiam facile ex supra dictis percipitur nempe quod vera virtus nihil aliud sit quam ex solo rationis ductu vivere atque adeo impotentia in hoc solo consistit quod homo a rebus quæ extra ipsum sunt, duci se patiatur et ab iis ad ea agendum determinetur quæ rerum externarum communis constitutio, non autem ea quæ ipsa ipsius natura in se sola considerata postulat. Atque hæc illa sunt quæ in scholio propositionis 18 hujus partis demonstrare promisi, ex quibus apparet legem illam de non mactandis brutis magis vana superstitione et muliebri misericordia quam sana ratione fundatam esse. Docet quidem ratio nostrum utile quærendi necessitudinem cum hominibus jungere sed non cum brutis aut rebus quarum natura a natura humana est diversa sed idem jus quod illa in nos habent, nos in ea habere. Imo quia uniuscujusque jus virtute seu potentia uniuscujusque definitur, longe majus homines in bruta quam hæc in homines jus habent. Nec tamen nego bruta sentire sed nego quod propterea non liceat nostræ utilitati consulere et iisdem ad libitum uti eademque tractare prout nobis magis convenit quandoquidem nobiscum natura non conveniunt et eorum affectus ab affectibus humanis sunt natura diversi (vide scholium propositionis 57 partis III). Superest ut explicem quid justum, quid injustum, quid peccatum et quid denique meritum sit. Sed de his vide sequens scholium.
English (Elwes 1883)
He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to Religion. The desire of well--doing, which is engendered by a life according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference between true virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself.
[13] Honestas
Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii. of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note.
Modern English
One who is driven by affect alone in trying to get others to love what he loves, and to live according to his own disposition, acts from impulse only and is therefore disagreeable, especially to those who take pleasure in different things and who accordingly apply themselves with equal impulse to making everyone else live according to what pleases them. And since the highest good that human beings seek under the guidance of affect is often such that only one person can possess it, those who love it are not consistent within themselves: while they delight in singing its praises, they fear being believed. But one who tries to lead others by reason acts not by impulse but with humanity and kindness, and is wholly consistent within himself.
Whatever we desire and do, of which we are the cause in so far as we have an idea of God, that is, in so far as we know God, I refer to religion. The desire for doing good that arises in us from living under the guidance of reason I call piety. The desire by which a person living under the guidance of reason is bound to associate others with himself in friendship I call honour (E4P37S2); and by honourable I mean what human beings living under the guidance of reason praise, and by base what is contrary to winning friendship. I have also shown what the foundations of a civil order are.
The difference between true virtue and powerlessness is easily grasped from what has been said: namely, that true virtue is nothing other than living under the sole guidance of reason, and that powerlessness consists entirely in this, that a person allows himself to be led by things external to himself and to be determined by them to act as the common constitution of external things requires, rather than as his own nature, considered solely in itself, demands.
These are the matters I undertook to demonstrate in the Scholium of Proposition 18 of this Part. From them it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is grounded more in empty superstition and weak-spirited pity than in sound reason. Reason does indeed teach us the necessity of associating ourselves with other human beings for our advantage, but not with beasts or things whose nature differs from human nature. The same right that they have over us, we have over them. Indeed, since every individual's right is defined by that individual's virtue or power, human beings have far greater right over beasts than beasts have over human beings. I do not deny that beasts feel. What I deny is that we are therefore not permitted to consult our own advantage and to use them as we please, treating them in whatever way suits us best, since their nature does not accord with ours and their affects differ in nature from human affects (E3P57S). It remains for me to explain what is just, what unjust, what sin, and what merit. On these points see the following scholium.