E3P57S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Hinc sequitur affectus animalium quæ irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus postquam mentis novimus originem) ab affectibus hominum tantum differre quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo libidine procreandi; at ille libidine equina hic autem humana. Sic etiam libidines et appetitus insectorum, piscium et avium alii atque alii esse debent. Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua qua constat natura, contentum vivat eaque gaudeat, vita tamen illa qua unumquodque est contentum et gaudium nihil aliud est quam idea seu anima ejusdem individui atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Denique ex præcedenti propositione sequitur non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium quo ebrius exempli gratia ducitur et inter gaudium quo potitur philosophus, quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque hæc de affectibus qui ad hominem referuntur quatenus patitur. Superest ut pauca addam de iis qui ad eundem referuntur quatenus agit.
English (Elwes 1883)
Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active.
Modern English
From this it follows that the affects of animals we call irrational, for we cannot doubt that brutes feel, now that we have come to understand the origin of mind, differ from human affects only to the extent that their nature differs from human nature. Horse and man are alike driven by the desire to procreate, but the horse's desire is equine and the human's is human. So too the desires and appetites of insects, fish, and birds must differ accordingly. Thus, although every individual lives content and rejoices in the nature that constitutes it, that life of contentment and that joy are nothing other than the idea, or soul, of the individual itself. The joy of one individual therefore differs in nature from the joy of another only to the extent that the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.
Lastly, it follows from the preceding proposition that there is no small difference between the joy that drives a drunkard, say, and the joy possessed by a philosopher, which I mention here only in passing. So much for the affects attributed to a human being insofar as he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributed to him insofar as he acts.