E4Cap25
Chapter — Part IV
Latin
Modestia hoc est cupiditas hominibus placendi quæ ex ratione determinatur, ad pietatem (ut in scholio I propositionis 37 partis IV diximus) refertur. Sed si ex affectu oriatur, ambitio est sive cupiditas qua homines falsa pietatis imagine plerumque discordias et seditiones concitant. Nam qui reliquos consilio aut re juvare cupit ut simul summo fruantur bono, is apprime studebit eorum sibi amorem conciliare; non autem eos in admirationem traducere ut disciplina ex ipso habeat vocabulum nec ullas absolute invidiæ causas dare. In communibus deinde colloquiis cavebit hominum vitia referre et de humana impotentia non nisi parce loqui curabit : at largiter de humana virtute seu potentia et qua via possit perfici ut sic homines non ex metu aut aversione sed solo lætitiæ affectu, moti ex rationis præscripto quantum in se est, conentur vivere.
English (Elwes 1883)
Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to reason.
Modern English
Decorum — that is, the desire to please others when determined by reason — belongs to piety (as we said in the first Scholium of Proposition 37 of Part IV (E4P37S1)). But if it arises from an affect, it is ambition — the desire by which people, under a false image of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For one who wants to help others with counsel or deed so that they may together enjoy the highest good will above all strive to win their love — not to draw them into admiration, not to have a system named after himself, and not to give any cause for envy. In common conversation he will be careful not to speak of people's faults and will say little about human impotence. He will speak at length of human virtue and power, and of how it can be perfected — so that people may be moved not by fear or aversion but by joy alone, as far as lies in them, to try to live by the guidance of reason.