E2P40S1
Scholium — Part II
Latin
His causam notionum quæ communes vocantur quæque ratiocinii nostri fundamenta sunt, explicui. Sed aliæ quorundam axiomatum sive notionum causæ dantur quas hac nostra methodo explicare e re foret; ex iis namque constaret quænam notiones præ reliquis utiliores, quænam vero vix ullius usus essent. Deinde quænam communes et quænam iis tantum qui præjudiciis non laborant, claræ et distinctæ et quænam denique male fundatæ sint. Præterea constaret unde notiones illæ quas secundas vocant et consequenter axiomata quæ in iisdem fundantur suam duxerunt originem et alia quæ circa hæc aliquando meditatus sum. Sed quoniam hæc alii dicavi tractatui et etiam ne propter nimiam hujus rei prolixitatem fastidium crearem, hac re hic supersedere decrevi. Attamen ne quid horum omittam quod scitu necessarium sit, causas breviter addam ex quibus termini transcendentales dicti suam duxerunt originem ut Ens, Res, Aliquid. Hi termini ex hoc oriuntur quod scilicet humanum corpus quandoquidem limitatum est, tantum est capax certi imaginum numeri (quid imago sit explicui in scholio propositionis 17 hujus) in se distincte simul formandi, qui si excedatur, hæ imagines confundi incipient et si hic imaginum numerus quarum corpus est capax ut eas in se simul distincte formet, longe excedatur, omnes inter se plane confundentur. Cum hoc ita se habeat, patet ex corollario propositionis 17 et propositione 18 hujus quod mens humana tot corpora distincte simul imaginari poterit quot in ipsius corpore imagines possunt simul formari. At ubi imagines in corpore plane confunduntur, mens etiam omnia corpora confuse sine ulla distinctione imaginabitur et quasi sub uno attributo comprehendet nempe sub attributo entis, rei etc. Potest hoc etiam ex eo deduci quod imagines non semper æque vigeant et ex aliis causis his analogis quas hic explicare non est opus nam ad nostrum ad quem collimamus scopum, unam tantum sufficit considerare. Nam omnes huc redeunt quod hi termini ideas significent summo gradu confusas. Ex similibus deinde causis ortæ sunt notiones illæ quas universales vocant ut Homo, Equus, Canis etc. videlicet quia in corpore humano tot imagines exempli gratia hominum formantur simul ut vim imaginandi, non quidem penitus sed eo usque tamen superent ut singulorum parvas differentias (videlicet uniuscujusque colorem, magnitudinem etc.) eorumque determinatum numerum mens imaginari nequeat et id tantum in quo omnes quatenus corpus ab iisdem afficitur, conveniunt, distincte imaginetur nam ab eo corpus maxime scilicet ab unoquoque singulari affectum fuit atque hoc nomine hominis exprimit hocque de infinitis singularibus prædicat. Nam singularium determinatum numerum ut diximus imaginari nequit. Sed notandum has notiones non ab omnibus eodem modo formari sed apud unumquemque variare pro ratione rei a qua corpus affectum sæpius fuit quamque facilius mens imaginatur vel recordatur. Exempli gratia qui sæpius cum admiratione hominum staturam contemplati sunt, sub nomine hominis intelligent animal erectæ staturæ; qui vero aliud assueti sunt contemplari, aliam hominum communem imaginem formabunt nempe hominem esse animal risibile, animal bipes sine plumis, animal rationale et sic de reliquis unusquisque pro dispositione sui corporis rerum universales imagines formabit. Quare non mirum est quod inter philosophos qui res naturales per solas rerum imagines explicare voluerunt, tot sint ortæ controversiæ.
English (Elwes 1883)
I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill--founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two--footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.
It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.
Modern English
With this I have explained the cause of the notions called common, which form the foundation of our reasoning. There are, however, other causes of certain axioms and notions that it would be worth explaining by our method, for it would then become clear which notions are more useful than others, and which are of almost no use at all. It would also become clear which notions are common to everyone, which are clear and distinct only to those free from prejudice, and which are badly founded. Again, it would show where the notions called second intentions come from, and consequently where the axioms built on them come from, along with other matters I have sometimes reflected on in this connection. But since I have reserved those questions for another treatise, and since I am also anxious not to cause tedium by excessive length on this point, I have decided to pass over them here.
Still, in order to omit nothing necessary to know, I will briefly add the causes from which the terms called transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something, take their origin. These terms arise from the fact that the human body, being limited, can form within itself only a certain number of images distinctly at the same time (I explained what an image is in (E2P17S)). If that number is exceeded, the images begin to become confused; and if the number of images the body can form distinctly within itself at the same time is far exceeded, they all become entirely confused with one another. Since this is so, it is evident from (E2P17C) and (E2P18) that the human mind will be able to imagine distinctly as many bodies simultaneously as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images in the body become entirely confused, the mind will also imagine all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely under the attribute of being, of thing, and so on. The same conclusion can also be drawn from the fact that images do not always persist with equal vigor, and from other analogous causes that there is no need to explain here. For the purpose we have in view, it is enough to consider one cause alone, for all of them come down to this: that these terms signify ideas that are confused to the highest degree.
From similar causes arose the notions called universal, such as Man, Horse, Dog, and the like. They arise because so many images, of men for example, are formed simultaneously in the human body that they exceed the power of imagination, not entirely, but to the point where the mind can no longer imagine the small differences among individuals (such as the color, size, and so on of each one) or their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only that in which all the individuals, insofar as the body is affected by them, agree, for that is what each of the particular individuals most strongly affected the body with, and this it expresses by the name man and predicates of infinitely many individuals. For, as we said, it cannot imagine their determinate number.
It must be noted, however, that these notions are not formed in the same way by all people, but vary from person to person in proportion to what the body has been most frequently affected by and what the mind most easily imagines or recalls. For example, those who have most often contemplated the stature of human beings with admiration will understand by the name man an animal of erect stature; those accustomed to contemplate something else will form another common image of man, say, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and in this way each person, according to the disposition of his body, will form universal images of things. So it is no wonder that so many controversies have arisen among philosophers who have sought to explain natural things by images of those things alone.