E5P28D
Demonstration — Part V
Latin
Hæc propositio per se patet. Nam quicquid clare et distincte intelligimus, id vel per se vel per aliud quod per se concipitur, intelligimus hoc est ideæ quæ in nobis claræ et distinctæ sunt sive quæ ad tertium cognitionis genus referuntur (vide II scholium propositionis 40 partis II) non possunt sequi ex ideis mutilatis et confusis quæ (per idem scholium) ad primum cognitionis genus referuntur sed ex ideis adæquatis sive (per idem scholium) ex secundo et tertio cognitionis genere ac proinde (per 1 affectuum definitionem) cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere non potest oriri ex primo, at quidem ex secundo. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
This proposition is self--evident. For whatsoever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.
Modern English
This proposition is self-evident. Whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself or through something else that is conceived through itself, that is, ideas that are clear and distinct in us, or that belong to the third kind of knowledge (E2P40S2), cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, which belong to the first kind of knowledge (E2P40S2), but only from adequate ideas, that is (E2P40S2), from the second and third kinds of knowledge. Therefore (E3DA1), the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind, but can arise from the second. Q.E.D.