E3DA1
Definition of an Emotion — Part III
Latin
Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.
Explicatio: Diximus supra in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis cupiditatem esse appetitum cum ejusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem scholio etiam monui me revera inter humanum appetitum et cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque atque adeo ne tautologiam committere viderer, cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui sed eandem ita definire studui ut omnes humanæ naturæ conatus quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem. Potueram enim dicere cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum sed ex hac definitione (per propositionem 23 partis II) non sequeretur quod mens possit suæ cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur ut hujus conscientiæ causam involverem, necesse fuit (per eandem propositionem) addere "quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata etc.". Nam per affectionem humanæ essentiæ quamcunque ejusdem essentiæ constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata sive quod ipsa per solum cogitationis sive per solum extensionis attributum concipiatur sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscunque conatus, impetus, appetitus et volitiones, qui pro varia ejusdem hominis constitutione varii et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi sunt ut homo diversimode trahatur et quo se vertat, nesciat.
English (Elwes 1883)
Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.
Explanation: We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from such a definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add, in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c. For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn.
Modern English
Desire is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined by some given affection to act in a particular way.
Explanation. We said above, in the scholium of Proposition 9 of this Part, that desire is appetite together with consciousness of that appetite; and that appetite is the essence of a human being insofar as it is determined to do the things that serve its preservation. In that same scholium I also noted that I in fact recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a person is conscious of their appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite. So to avoid appearing to commit a tautology, I chose not to explain desire by means of appetite, but instead to define it in a way that comprehends under one heading all the strivings of human nature that we signify by the names appetite, will, desire, or impulse. For I could have said that desire is the essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined to act in some way; but from that definition (E2P23) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. So in order to involve the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (E2P23) to add the clause "insofar as it is determined by some given affection of it, and so on." For by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution whatsoever of that essence, whether it is innate, or whether it is conceived solely through the attribute of thought, or solely through the attribute of extension, or lastly whether it is referred to both at once. By the term desire, then, I here understand all of a person's strivings, impulses, appetites, and acts of will, which vary according to each person's constitution and are, not infrequently, so opposed to one another that the person is pulled in different directions and does not know which way to turn.