E3P59S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Omnes actiones quæ sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem referuntur quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare et sibi amicitia jungere. Eas itaque actiones quæ solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem et quæ alterius etiam utile intendunt ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis præsentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc. species generositatis sunt. Atque his puto me præcipuos affectus animique fluctuationes quæ ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum nempe cupiditatis, lætitiæ et tristitiæ oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet nos a causis externis multis modis agitari nosque perinde ut maris undæ a contrariis ventis agitatæ fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios. At dixi me præcipuos tantum, non omnes qui dari possunt animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via qua supra procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse junctum p°nitentiæ, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo affectus tot modis alios cum aliis posse componi indeque tot variationes oriri ut nullo numero definiri queant. Sed ad meum institutum præcipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit nam reliqui quos omisi plus curiositatis quam utilitatis haberent. Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat quod scilicet sæpissime contingit dum re quam appetebamus fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem a qua aliter determinatur et aliæ rerum imagines in eo excitantur et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Exempli gratia cum aliquid quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore jam aliter disposito ejusdem cibi imago quia ipse præsens adest, fomentetur et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi, huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit et consequenter cibi quem appetebamus, præsentia odiosa erit et hoc est quod fastidium et tædium vocamus. Cæterum corporis affectiones externas quæ in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc. neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quædam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.
English (Elwes 1883)
All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.
I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However, for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment, acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when we conceive something which generally delights us with its flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should here and there be added.
Modern English
All actions that follow from affects attributable to the mind insofar as it understands, I refer to strength of character (*fortitudo*), which I divide into courage (*animositas*) and high-mindedness (*generositas*). By courage I mean the desire by which each person strives, from reason alone, to preserve their own being. By high-mindedness I mean the desire by which each person strives, from reason alone, to aid others and to unite with them in friendship. Those actions that aim solely at the agent's advantage I refer to courage; those that also aim at another's advantage I refer to high-mindedness. Temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, and the like, are species of courage. Modesty, clemency, and the like, are species of high-mindedness.
With this I think I have explained the chief affects and vacillations of the mind that arise from the composition of the three primitive affects, desire, joy, and sadness, and shown them through their primary causes. This makes clear that we are driven in many ways by external causes and tossed about like waves of the sea stirred by contrary winds, ignorant of what will happen and of our fate.
I said I have shown only the chief conflicts of the mind, not all that can occur. Proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is joined with repentance, disdain, shame, and so on. I believe it is clear to everyone from what has been said that affects can be compounded with one another in so many ways, and so many variations arise from them, that no number could bound them. For my purpose it has been enough to enumerate the chief ones; those I have omitted would yield more curiosity than use.
There remains one thing worth noting about love: it very often happens that while we are enjoying something we desired, the body acquires a new disposition from that enjoyment, by which it is determined otherwise, and other images of things are aroused in it; the mind accordingly begins to imagine and to desire something different. For example, when we imagine something that usually delights us with its taste, we desire to enjoy it, that is, to eat it. But while we are so enjoying it, the stomach fills and the body is otherwise disposed. If then, with the body now differently disposed, the image of the food is stimulated because the food is present, and consequently the striving or desire to eat it is stimulated as well, this new disposition of the body will resist that desire; and accordingly the presence of the food we had wanted will become hateful. This is what we call satiety and disgust.
As for the external bodily modifications observable in affects, such as trembling, pallor, hiccupping, laughter, and the like, I have set these aside, because they belong to the body alone without any reference to the mind. Finally, a few things are worth noting about the definitions of the affects; I will therefore repeat them in order and add, among the definitions themselves, whatever should be observed in each one.