E4P73S
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Hæc et similia quæ de vera hominis libertate ostendimus, ad fortitudinem hoc est (per scholium propositionis 59 partis III) ad animositatem et generositatem referuntur. Nec operæ pretium duco omnes fortitudinis proprietates hic separatim demonstrare et multo minus quod vir fortis neminem odio habeat, nemini irascatur, invideat, indignetur, neminem despiciat minimeque superbiat. Nam hæc et omnia quæ ad veram vitam et religionem spectant, facile ex propositione 37 et 46 hujus partis convincuntur nempe quod odium amore contra vincendum sit et quod unusquisque qui ratione ducitur, bonum quod sibi appetit, reliquis etiam ut sit, cupiat. Ad quod accedit id quod in scholio propositionis 50 hujus partis et aliis in locis notavimus quod scilicet vir fortis hoc apprime consideret nempe quod omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequantur ac proinde quicquid molestum et malum esse cogitat et quicquid præterea impium, horrendum, injustum et turpe videtur, ex eo oritur quod res ipsas perturbate, mutilate et confuse concipit et hac de causa apprime conatur res ut in se sunt, concipere et veræ cognitionis impedimenta amovere ut sunt odium, ira, invidia, irrisio, superbia et reliqua hujusmodi quæ in præcedentibus notavimus atque adeo quantum potest conatur uti diximus bene agere et lætari. Quousque autem humana virtus ad hæc consequenda se extendat et quid possit in sequenti parte demonstrabo.
English (Elwes 1883)
These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.; namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part.
Modern English
What we have shown about the true freedom of a person — these and similar results — belong to *fortitudo*, that is (E3P59S), to courage (*animositas*) and nobility of character (*generositas*). I do not think it worth demonstrating separately all the properties of fortitude, and even less worth showing that the person of fortitude hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant at no one, despises no one, and is least of all proud. For these things, and everything that bears on the true way of life and religion, are easily established from Propositions 37 and 46 of this Part (E4P37): namely, that hatred is to be overcome with love, and that everyone guided by reason desires for others the same good they seek for themselves.
To this we may add what we noted in the scholium to Proposition 50 of this Part (E4P50S) and elsewhere: a person of fortitude keeps this above all in view — that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and therefore whatever they think troublesome and bad, and whatever besides appears impious, horrible, unjust, and shameful, arises from the fact that they conceive things themselves in a disturbed, mutilated, and confused way. For that reason they strive above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to genuine knowledge — obstacles such as hatred, anger, envy, mockery, pride, and the rest of that kind, which we have noted in the preceding pages. And so, as we said, they strive as far as possible to act well and to go on their way rejoicing. How far human virtue extends toward achieving these things, and what it is capable of, I will show in the following Part.