E1P33D
Demonstration of Proposition 33 — Part I
Latin
Res enim omnes ex data Dei natura necessario sequutæ sunt (per propositionem 16) et ex necessitate naturæ Dei determinatæ sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (per propositionem 29). Si itaque res alterius naturæ potuissent esse vel alio modo ad operandum determinari ut naturæ ordo alius esset, ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est ac proinde (per propositionem 11) illa etiam deberet existere et consequenter duo vel plures possent dari Dii, quod (per corollarium I propositionis 14) est absurdum. Quapropter res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine etc. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
All things necessarily follow from the nature of God (Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore, could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have been different, God's nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that different nature also would have perforce existed, and consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things could not have been brought into being by God in any other manner, &c. Q.E.D.
Modern English
All things follow necessarily from God's given nature (E1P16), and they are determined by God's nature to exist and act in a specific way (E1P29). If things could have been of a different nature, or determined to act differently so that the order of nature was different, then God's nature too could have been different from what it now is. That different nature would also have had to exist (E1P11), and consequently two or more Gods could have existed, which is absurd (E1P14C1). Therefore things could not have been produced by God in any other way or order. Q.E.D.