E1P33S1
Scholium — Part I
Latin
Quoniam his luce meridiana clarius ostendi nihil absolute in rebus dari propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare jam paucis volo quid nobis per contingens erit intelligendum sed prius quid per necessarium et impossibile. Res aliqua necessaria dicitur vel ratione suæ essentiæ vel ratione causæ. Rei enim alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua impossibilis dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit vel quia nulla causa externa datur ad talem rem producendam determinata. At res aliqua nulla alia de causa contingens dicitur nisi respectu defectus nostræ cognitionis. Res enim cujus essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus vel de qua probe scimus eandem nullam contradictionem involvere et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet, ea nunquam nec ut necessaria nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest ideoque eandem vel contingentem vel possibilem vocamus.
English (Elwes 1883)
As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words necessary and impossible.
A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge.
A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
Modern English
Since I have shown here more clearly than daylight that there is nothing in things that could justify calling them contingent, I want to explain briefly what we should understand by the word "contingent" — but first what we should understand by "necessary" and "impossible."
A thing is called necessary either because of its essence or because of its cause. Its existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For these same reasons a thing is also called impossible: because either its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause exists that is determined to produce it. But a thing is called contingent for no other reason than the deficiency of our knowledge.
A thing whose essence we do not know to involve a contradiction, or a thing we know does not involve a contradiction but about whose existence we can affirm nothing certain because the order of causes is hidden from us, can never appear to us as either necessary or impossible. We therefore call it contingent or possible.