E4P4D
Demonstration — Part IV
Latin
Potentia qua res singulares et consequenter homo suum esse conservat, est ipsa Dei sive Naturæ potentia (per corollarium propositionis 24 partis I) non quatenus infinita est sed quatenus per humanam actualem essentiam explicari potest (per propositionem 7 partis III). Potentia itaque hominis quatenus per ipsius actualem essentiam explicatur, pars est infinitæ Dei seu Naturæ potentiæ hoc est (per propositionem 34 partis I) essentiæ, quod erat primum. Deinde si fieri posset ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes nisi quæ per solam ipsius hominis naturam possint intelligi, sequeretur (per propositiones 4 et 6 partis III) ut non posset perire sed ut semper necessario existeret atque hoc sequi deberet ex causa cujus potentia finita aut infinita sit nempe vel ex sola hominis potentia, qui scilicet potis esset ut a se removeret reliquas mutationes quæ a causis externis oriri possent vel infinita Naturæ potentia a qua omnia singularia ita dirigerentur ut homo nullas alias posset pati mutationes nisi quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. At primum (per propositionem præcedentem cujus demonstratio universalis est et ad omnes res singulares applicari potest) est absurdum; ergo si fieri posset ut homo nullas pateretur mutationes nisi quæ per solam ipsius hominis naturam possent intelligi et consequenter (sicut jam ostendimus) ut semper necessario existeret, id sequi deberet ex Dei infinita potentia et consequenter (per propositionem 16 partis I) ex necessitate divinæ naturæ quatenus alicujus hominis idea affectus consideratur, totius Naturæ ordo quatenus ipsa sub extensionis et cogitationis attributis concipitur, deduci deberet atque adeo (per propositionem 21 partis I) sequeretur ut homo esset infinitus, quod (per I partem hujus demonstrationis) est absurdum. Fieri itaque nequit ut homo nullas alias patiatur mutationes nisi quarum ipse adæquata sit causa. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence (III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I. xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.
Modern English
The power by which singular things, and consequently each human being, preserve their being is the power of God or Nature (E1P24C) — not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the actual human essence (E3P7). The power of a human being, insofar as it is explained through his own actual essence, is therefore a part of the infinite power of God or Nature — that is (E1P34), of its essence. This was the first point.
Now suppose it were possible for a human being to undergo no changes save those that can be understood solely through his own nature. Then it would follow (E3P4) that he could not perish but would always necessarily exist. And this would have to follow from a cause whose power is either finite or infinite — either from the power of the human being alone (who would thus be able to remove from himself all changes that could arise from external causes), or from the infinite power of Nature (which would so order all singular things that the human being could undergo no changes except those serving his preservation). But the first alternative is absurd (E4P3), whose demonstration is universal and can be applied to all singular things. So if it were possible for a human being to undergo no changes save those that can be understood through his own nature alone, and consequently [as we have shown] to always necessarily exist, this would have to follow from God's infinite power, and consequently (E1P16) from the necessity of the divine nature insofar as it is considered as affected by the idea of some particular human being, the entire order of Nature insofar as it is conceived under the attributes of extension and thought would have to be deducible. It would therefore follow (E1P21) that the human being is infinite, which (from the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. It is therefore impossible for a human being to undergo no changes of which he is not the adequate cause. Q.E.D.