E3P55S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Hæc tristitia concomitante idea nostræ imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur; lætitia autem quæ ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur. Et quoniam hæc toties repetitur quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit ut unusquisque facta sua narrare suique tam corporis quam animi vires ostentare gestiat et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur homines natura esse invidos (vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus) sive ob suorum æqualium imbecillitatem gaudere et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari. Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur toties lætitia (per propositionem 53 hujus) afficitur et eo majore quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur hoc est (per illa quæ in scholio I propositionis 40 partis II dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest. Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit quando aliquid in se contemplatur quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit et contra contristabitur si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per propositionem 28 hujus) amovere conabitur idque suorum æqualium actiones perperam interpretando vel suas quantum potest adornando. Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidiæ stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.
English (Elwes 1883)
This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called self--love or self--complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv. note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III. liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. xl. note), in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain (III. xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can, embellishing his own.
It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts, I append the following corollary.
Modern English
This sadness, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility. The joy arising from contemplation of ourselves is called self-love or self-complacency. And since this joy is renewed as often as a person contemplates his own virtues or his own power of acting, it follows that everyone is eager to recount his own deeds and to display the strength of both body and mind, and that for this reason people are a nuisance to each other.
Again, it follows that people are envious by nature (E3P24S), rejoicing in the weakness of their equals and, by contrast, saddened by their virtue. For whenever anyone imagines his own actions, he is affected with joy (E3P53) in proportion as his actions express more perfection and he imagines them more distinctly, that is (E2P40S1), in proportion as he can distinguish them from others and regard them as singular things. So a person takes the greatest pleasure in contemplating himself when he contemplates something in himself that he denies to others. But if what he affirms of himself he refers to the universal idea of man or animal, he will not rejoice as much; and he will, on the contrary, be saddened if he imagines his own actions to be weaker when compared with those of others. He will strive to remove that sadness (E3P28) by misinterpreting the actions of his equals or by embellishing his own as much as he can.
It is thus clear that people are by nature inclined toward hatred and envy, and education reinforces this. For parents are accustomed to spur their children to virtue by the incentive of honor and envy alone. But perhaps a scruple remains, that we not infrequently admire men's virtues and venerate those who possess them. To remove this difficulty I add the following corollary.