E3P50S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Res quæ per accidens spei aut metus sunt causæ, bona aut mala omina vocantur. Deinde quatenus hæc eadem omina sunt spei aut metus causa eatenus (per definitionem spei et metus, quam vide in scholio II propositionis 18 hujus) lætitiæ aut tristitiæ sunt causa et consequenter (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus et (per propositionem 28 hujus) tanquam media ad ea quæ speramus, adhibere vel tanquam obstacula aut metus causas amovere conamur. Præterea ex propositione 25 hujus sequitur nos natura ita esse constitutos ut ea quæ speramus, facile, quæ autem timemus, difficile credamus et ut de iis plus minusve justo sentiamus. Atque ex his ortæ sunt superstitiones quibus homines ubique conflictantur. Cæterum non puto operæ esse pretium animi hic ostendere fluctuationes quæ ex spe et metu oriuntur quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus) et præterea quandoquidem quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus atque adeo quicquid de amore et odio diximus, facile unusquisque spei et metui applicare poterit.
English (Elwes 1883)
Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, from III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred.
Modern English
Things that are accidentally causes of hope or fear are called good or bad omens. Insofar as these omens are causes of hope or fear, they are also causes of joy or sadness, by the definitions of hope and fear given in Scholium 2 to Proposition 18 of this Part (E3P18S2). Consequently we love or hate them accordingly (E3P15C), and we strive either to employ them as means toward what we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles and sources of what we fear (E3P28).
From Proposition 25 of this Part (E3P25) it also follows that we are by nature constituted to believe readily what we hope for and with difficulty what we fear, and to judge such things as more or less than they truly are. From this have arisen the superstitions by which people everywhere are beset.
I do not think it worth showing here all the fluctuations that arise from hope and fear, since from the mere definition of these affects it follows that there is no hope without fear and no fear without hope, as I will explain more fully in the proper place. Besides, insofar as we hope for or fear something, we love or hate it accordingly; so everyone can apply to hope and fear for themselves whatever I have said about love and hatred.