E3P11S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes et jam ad majorem jam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quæ quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ. Per lætitiam itaque in sequentibus intelligam passionem qua mens ad majorem perfectionem transit. Per tristitiam autem passionem qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem. Porro affectum lætitiæ ad mentem et corpus simul relatum titillationem vel hilaritatem voco, tristitiæ autem dolorem vel melancholiam. Sed notandum titillationem et dolorem ad hominem referri quando una ejus pars præ reliquis est affecta; hilaritatem autem et melancholiam quando omnes pariter sunt affectæ. Quid deinde cupiditas sit in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis explicui et præter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium nam reliquos ex his tribus oriri in sequentibus ostendam. Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius propositionem 10 hujus partis explicare ut clarius intelligatur qua ratione idea ideæ sit contraria. In scholio propositionis 17 partis II ostendimus ideam quæ mentis essentiam constituit, corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere quamdiu ipsum corpus existit. Deinde ex iis quæ in corollario propositionis 8 partis II et in ejusdem scholio ostendimus, sequitur præsentem nostræ mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere quod scilicet mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Denique mentis potentiam qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (vide propositiones 17 et 18 partis II cum ejus scholio) quod ipsa actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur mentis præsentem existentiam ejusque imaginandi potentiam tolli simulatque mens præsentem corporis existentiam affirmare desinit. At causa cur mens hanc corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa mens (per propositionem 4 hujus) nec etiam quod corpus esse desinit. Nam (per propositionem 6 partis II) causa cur mens corporis existentiam affirmat, non est quia corpus existere incepit : quare per eandem rationem nec ipsius corporis existentiam affirmare desinit quia corpus esse desinit sed (per propositionem 8 partis II) hoc ab alia idea oritur quæ nostri corporis et consequenter nostræ mentis præsentem existentiam secludit quæque adeo ideæ quæ nostræ mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.
English (Elwes 1883)
Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind.
Modern English
We see from this that the mind can undergo great changes and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive transitions explain the affects of joy and sadness. By joy in what follows I mean the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection. By sadness I mean the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection.
The affect of joy referred to both mind and body together I call stimulation or cheerfulness; the affect of sadness in the same reference I call pain or melancholy. One must note, however, that stimulation and pain are attributed to a person when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, while cheerfulness and melancholy are attributed when all parts are equally affected. What desire is I have explained in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this Part. Beyond these three I recognize no other primary affects; I will show as I proceed that all other affects arise from these three.
But before going further I want to explain Proposition 10 of this Part at greater length, so that we can understand more clearly in what sense one idea is contrary to another. In the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2 (E2P17S) we showed that the idea constituting the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body for as long as the body itself exists. From what we showed in the Corollary to Proposition 8 of Part 2 (E2P8C) and its Scholium it follows that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (E2P17S) (E2P18S) that the power of the mind by which it imagines things and remembers them also depends on the mind involving the actual existence of the body. From this it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body.
Now the cause by which the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself (E3P4), nor can it be that the body ceases to exist. For (E2P6) the cause by which the mind affirms the existence of the body is not that the body began to exist. By the same reasoning, the mind does not cease to affirm the existence of the body because the body ceases to exist. Rather (E2P17), this follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea that constitutes the essence of our mind.