E3DA4
Definition of an Emotion — Part III
Latin
Admiratio est rei alicujus imaginatio in qua mens defixa propterea manet quia hæc singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide propositionem 52 cum ejusdem scholio.
Explicatio: In scholio propositionis 18 partis II ostendimus quænam sit causa cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat videlicet quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatæ et ita ordinatæ sunt ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit quando rei imago nova est sed mens in ejusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novæ imaginatio in se considerata ejusdem naturæ est ac reliquæ et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero nec causam video cur id facerem quandoquidem hæc mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva quæ mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur sed tantum ex eo quod causa cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit. Tres igitur (ut in scholio propositionis 11 hujus monui) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco nempe lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis nec alia de causa verba de admiratione feci quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad objecta quæ admiramur, referuntur; quæ quidem ratio me ex æquo movet ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adjungam.
English (Elwes 1883)
Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and note).
Explanation: In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other causes to think of something else.
Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another.
I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition of contempt.
Modern English
Wonder is the imagination of a thing in which the mind remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with the others. See E3P52 and its scholium (E3P52).
Explanation: In the scholium of E2P18 (E2P18S) we showed why the mind passes at once from the contemplation of one thing to the contemplation of another, namely, because the images of those things are chained and ordered so that one follows the other. This association cannot occur when the image of the thing is new; the mind will then remain fixed in the contemplation of that thing until other causes determine it to think of something else.
Thus the imagination of a new thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as any other imagination, and for this reason I do not count wonder among the affects, nor do I see any reason to do so. This arrest of the mind arises from no positive cause that draws it away from other things, but simply from the absence of a cause that would determine it to pass from the contemplation of one thing to thinking of others. I therefore recognize (as I noted in the scholium of E3P11 (E3P11S)) only three primitive or primary affects: joy, sadness, and desire. I have spoken of wonder only because it has become customary to name by different terms certain affects derived from the three primary ones when they are referred to objects we wonder at, and the same reason moves me to add a definition of contempt.