E3DA49
Definition of an Emotion — Part III
Latin
Affectus qui animi pathema dicitur, est confusa idea qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur.
Explicatio: Dico primo affectum seu passionem animi esse confusam ideam. Nam mentem eatenus tantum pati ostendimus (vide propositionem 3 hujus) quatenus ideas inadæquatas sive confusas habet. Dico deinde "qua mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat". Omnes enim corporum ideæ quas habemus magis nostri corporis actualem constitutionem (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) quam corporis externi naturam indicant; at hæc quæ affectus formam constituit, corporis vel alicujus ejus partis constitutionem indicare vel exprimere debet quam ipsum corpus vel aliqua ejus pars habet ex eo quod ipsius agendi potentia sive existendi vis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur. Sed notandum cum dico "majorem vel minorem existendi vim quam antea", me non intelligere quod mens præsentem corporis constitutionem cum præterita comparat sed quod idea quæ affectus formam constituit, aliquid de corpore affirmat quod plus minusve realitatis revera involvit quam antea. Et quia essentia mentis in hoc consistit (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) quod sui corporis actualem existentiam affirmat et nos per perfectionem ipsam rei essentiam intelligimus, sequitur ergo quod mens ad majorem minoremve perfectionem transit quando ei aliquid de suo corpore vel aliqua ejus parte affirmare contingit quod plus minusve realitatis involvit quam antea. Cum igitur supra dixerim mentis cogitandi potentiam augeri vel minui, nihil aliud intelligere volui quam quod mens ideam sui corporis vel alicujus ejus partis formaverit quæ plus minusve realitatis exprimit quam de suo corpore affirmaverat. Nam idearum præstantia et actualis cogitandi potentia ex objecti præstantia æstimatur. Addidi denique "et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur" ut præter lætitiæ et tristitiæ naturam quam prima definitionis pars explicat, cupiditatis etiam naturam exprimerem. Finis tertiæ partis
English (Elwes 1883)
Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.
Explanation: I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III. iii.) I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.) than the nature of an external body. But the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its power of action or force for existence is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality than before.
And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II. xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less reality than before.
When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
Modern English
An affect, which is called a passion of the mind, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its body, or of some part of it, than before, and by whose presence the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.
Explanation. I say first that an affect, or passion of the mind, is a confused idea. For we have shown (E3P3) that the mind is passive only insofar as it has inadequate or confused ideas.
I say next that it is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its body, or some part of it, than before. For all the ideas of bodies that we have indicate the actual constitution of our own body (E2P16C2) more than the nature of the external body. But the idea that constitutes the form of an affect must indicate, or express, the constitution of the body, or of some part of it, that the body or some part of it has from the fact that its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or checked.
Note that when I say a greater or lesser force of existing than before, I do not mean that the mind compares the present constitution of the body with a past one. I mean that the idea constituting the form of the affect affirms something of the body that involves more or less reality than what the mind affirmed before.
Because the essence of the mind consists (E2P11) in the fact that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and because we understand perfection as the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm something of its body, or of some part of it, that involves more or less reality than before. When I said above that the mind's power of thinking is increased or diminished, I meant only that the mind had formed an idea of its body, or some part of it, that expresses more or less reality than what it had affirmed of its body before. The excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking, are measured by the excellence of the object.
Finally, I added that it is by the presence of this idea that the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another, so that, beyond the nature of joy and sadness that the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire. End of Part Three.