E3DA48
Definition of an Emotion — Part III
Latin
Libido est etiam cupiditas et amor in commiscendis corporibus.
Explicatio: Sive hæc coeundi cupiditas moderata sit sive non sit, libido appellari solet. Porro hi quinque affectus (ut in scholio propositionis 56 hujus monui) contrarios non habent. Nam modestia species est ambitionis, de qua vide scholium propositionis 29 hujus. Temperantiam deinde, sobrietatem et castitatem mentis potentiam, non autem passionem indicare jam etiam monui. Et tametsi fieri potest ut homo avarus, ambitiosus vel timidus a nimio cibo, potu et coitu abstineat, avaritia tamen, ambitio et timor luxuriæ, ebrietati vel libidini non sunt contrarii. Nam avarus in cibum et potum alienum se ingurgitare plerumque desiderat. Ambitiosus autem, modo speret fore clam, in nulla re sibi temperabit et si inter ebrios vivat et libidinosos, ideo quia ambitiosus est, proclivior erit ad eadem vitia. Timidus denique id quod non vult, facit. Nam quamvis mortis vitandæ causa divitias in mare projiciat, manet tamen avarus et si libidinosus tristis est quod sibi morem gerere nequeat, non desinit propterea libidinosus esse. Et absolute hi affectus non tam ipsos actus convivandi, potandi etc. respiciunt quam ipsum appetitum et amorem. Nihil igitur his affectibus opponi potest præter generositatem et animositatem, de quibus in sequentibus. Definitiones zelotypiæ et reliquarum animi fluctuationum silentio prætermitto tam quia ex compositione affectuum quos jam definivimus, oriuntur quam quia pleræque nomina non habent, quod ostendit ad usum vitæ sufficere easdem in genere tantummodo noscere. Cæterum ex definitionibus affectuum quos explicuimus, liquet eos omnes a cupiditate, lætitia vel tristitia oriri seu potius nihil præter hos tres esse quorum unusquisque variis nominibus appellari solet propter varias eorum relationes et denominationes extrinsecas. Si jam ad hos primitivos et ad ea quæ de natura mentis supra diximus, attendere velimus, affectus quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur sic definire poterimus.
English (Elwes 1883)
Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.
Explanation: Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a species of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.
Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man's expense. An ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will speak presently.
The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
Modern English
Lust is also desire and love in the joining of bodies.
Whether this desire for intercourse is moderate or not, it is still called lust. These last five affects, as I noted in the scholium of P56 (E3P56S), have no contraries. Deference is a species of ambition; see the scholium of P29 (E3P29S) on this. Temperance, sobriety, and chastity, as I have already noted, indicate a power of the mind, not a passion.
Still, it can happen that an avaricious, ambitious, or timid person abstains from excess in food, drink, and sex. But avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries of licentiousness, drunkenness, or lust. The avaricious person generally desires to gorge on another's food and drink. The ambitious person will restrain himself in nothing so long as he thinks it will go unnoticed, and if he lives among drunkards and the lustful, he will, precisely because he is ambitious, be all the more prone to those same vices. The timid person does what he would not. Although an avaricious person might throw his wealth into the sea to avoid death, he remains avaricious. And if a lustful person is saddened because he cannot indulge himself, he does not on that account cease to be lustful.
In short, these affects concern not so much the acts of feasting, drinking, and so on, as the appetite and love for them. Nothing can be opposed to these affects except generosity and strength of character, of which I will speak in what follows.
The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind I pass over in silence — both because they arise from combinations of the affects already defined, and because most of them have no names, which shows it is enough for the purposes of life to know them only in general.
From the definitions of the affects we have explained, it is clear that they all arise from desire, joy, or sadness, or rather, that there are only these three, each of which goes by various names on account of its various relations and external designations. If we now attend to these three primitive affects, and to what has been said above about the nature of the mind, we will be able to define the affects, insofar as they are referred to the mind alone, as follows.