E3P56S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Inter affectuum species quæ (per propositionem præcedentem) perplurimæ esse debent, insignes sunt luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et ambitio, quæ non nisi amoris vel cupiditatis sunt notiones quæ hujus utriusque affectus naturam explicant per objecta ad quæ referuntur. Nam per luxuriam, ebrietatem, libidinem, avaritiam et ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et gloriæ immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem. Præterea hi affectus quatenus eos per solum objectum ad quod referuntur ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent. Nam temperantia quam luxuriæ et sobrietas quam ebrietati et denique castitas quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt sed animi indicant potentiam quæ hos affectus moderatur. Cæterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot objectorum species) nec si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit uniuscujusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit inquam nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere ut determinare possimus qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum exempli gratia inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem, nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare, non est opus.
English (Elwes 1883)
Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, &c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last--named emotions. However, I cannot here explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have a general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference between various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.
Modern English
Among the species of affects, which, by the preceding proposition, must be very numerous, the most notable are lust, drunkenness, licentiousness, avarice, and ambition. These are nothing but species of love or desire that explain the nature of these two affects by reference to the objects to which they are directed. For by lust, drunkenness, licentiousness, avarice, and ambition we mean nothing other than the immoderate love or desire for feasting, drinking, sex, wealth, and glory.
Furthermore, these affects, insofar as we distinguish them from others solely by the objects they concern, have no contraries. For temperance, which we oppose to lust; sobriety, which we oppose to drunkenness; and chastity, which we oppose to licentiousness — these are not affects or passions but indicate a power of the mind that moderates these affects.
As for the remaining species of affects, I cannot explain them here, for they are as numerous as the species of objects, nor, if I could, would it be necessary. For our purpose, namely to determine the strength of the affects and the mind's power over them, it is enough to have a general definition of each affect. It is enough, I say, to understand the general properties of the affects and the mind, so that we can determine what kind and how great the mind's power is in moderating and checking the affects. So, although there is a large difference between this or that affect of love, hatred, or desire, for example between love toward one's children and love toward one's wife, it is not necessary for us to know those differences or to investigate the nature and origin of the affects further.