E4P68S
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Hujus propositionis hypothesin falsam esse nec posse concipi nisi quatenus ad solam naturam humanam seu potius ad Deum attendimus, non quatenus infinitus sed quatenus tantummodo causa est cur homo existat, patet ex 4 propositione hujus partis. Atque hoc et alia quæ jam demonstravimus, videntur a Mose significari in illa primi hominis historia. In ea enim nulla alia Dei potentia concipitur quam illa qua hominem creavit hoc est potentia qua hominis solummodo utilitati consuluit atque eatenus narratur quod Deus homini libero prohibuerit ne de arbore cognitionis boni et mali comederet et quod simulac de ea comederet, statim mortem metueret potius quam vivere cuperet. Deinde quod inventa ab homine uxore quæ cum sua natura prorsus conveniebat, cognovit nihil posse in natura dari quod ipsi posset illa esse utilius sed quod postquam bruta sibi similia esse credidit, statim eorum affectus imitari inceperit (vide propositionem 27 partis III) et libertatem suam amittere quam Patriarchæ postea recuperaverunt ducti spiritu Christi hoc est Dei idea a qua sola pendet ut homo liber sit et ut bonum quod sibi cupit, reliquis hominibus cupiat, ut supra (per propositionem 37 hujus) demonstravimus.
English (Elwes 1883)
It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.
This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
Modern English
That the hypothesis of this proposition is false and cannot be conceived, except insofar as we attend to human nature alone — or rather to God, not as infinite but only as the cause of human existence — is plain from Proposition 4 of this Part (E4P4).
This, and other things we have already demonstrated, seems to be what Moses signified in the story of the first man. In that account, no power of God is conceived other than the one by which he created man, that is, the power by which he provided solely for man’s advantage. It is there related that God forbade the free man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and bad, and that as soon as he ate of it, he would immediately fear death rather than desire to live. Then, that when man had found a woman who was in perfect harmony with his nature, he knew that nothing in nature could be more useful to him. But after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he immediately began to imitate their affects (E3P27) and lost his freedom. This freedom was later recovered by the Patriarchs, guided by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that a person be free and desire for others the good he desires for himself, as we demonstrated above (E4P37).