E4P33D
Demonstration — Part IV
Latin
Affectuum natura seu essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam seu naturam explicari (per definitiones 1 et 2 partis III) sed potentia hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) natura causarum externarum cum nostra comparata definiri debet; unde fit ut uniuscujusque affectus tot species dentur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur (vide propositionem 56 partis III) et ut homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode afficiantur (vide propositionem 51 partis III) atque eatenus natura discrepent et denique ut unus idemque homo (per eandem propositionem 51 partis III) erga idem objectum diversimode afficiatur atque eatenus varius sit etc. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i., ii.), but it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.
Modern English
The nature or essence of affects cannot be explained through our essence or nature alone (E3D1), but must be defined by the power — that is (E3P7), the nature — of external causes compared with our own. From this it follows that there are as many species of each affect as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected (E3P56), that men can be differently affected by one and the same object (E3P51) and to that extent differ in nature, and finally that one and the same person can be differently affected toward the same object (E3P51) and to that extent is variable and inconsistent.