E4P13D
Demonstration — Part IV
Latin
Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur quæ rei existentiam ponat (per definitionem 3 hujus). Sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quædam imaginamur quæ ejusdem præsentem existentiam secludunt. Verum quatenus eandem cum relatione ad tempus præteritum imaginamur eatenus aliquid imaginari supponimur quod ipsam ad memoriam redigit sive quod rei imaginem excitat (vide propositionem 18 partis II cum ejusdem scholio) ac proinde eatenus efficit ut ipsam ac si præsens esset, contemplemur (per corollarium propositionis 17 partis II) atque adeo (per propositionem 9 hujus) affectus erga rem contingentem quam scimus in præsenti non existere, cæteris paribus remissior erit quam affectus erga rem præteritam. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II. xvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.
Modern English
Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by the image of any other thing that posits its existence (E4D3). On the contrary, by hypothesis, we imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine the same thing in relation to past time, we are supposed to imagine something that brings it back to memory — that is, something that arouses the image of the thing (see E2P18 and its Scholium) — and this is what causes us to contemplate it as if it were present (E2P17C). Therefore (E4P9) an affect toward a contingent thing we know to be non-existent in the present is, all else being equal, weaker than an affect toward a past thing. Q.E.D.