E3P51S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Videmus itaque fieri posse ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat et ut unus idemque homo jam amet quod antea oderit et ut jam audeat quod antea timuit etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius et quid pejus sit (vide scholium propositionis 39 hujus) sequitur homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse et hinc fit ut cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Exempli gratia illum ego intrepidum vocabo qui malum contemnit quod ego timere soleo et si præterea ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo. Deinde ille mihi timidus videbitur qui malum timet quod ego contemnere soleo et si insuper ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas coercetur timore mali quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimem esse dicam et sic unusquisque judicabit. Denique ex hac hominis natura et judicii inconstantia ut et quod homo sæpe ex solo affectu de rebus judicat et quod res quas ad lætitiam vel tristitiam facere credit quasque propterea (per propositionem 28 hujus) ut fiant promovere vel amovere conatur, sæpe non nisi imaginariæ sint ut jam taceam alia quæ in II parte ostendimus de rerum incertitudine, facile concipimus hominem posse sæpe in causa esse tam ut contristetur quam ut lætetur sive ut tam tristitia quam lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea sui tanquam causa atque adeo facile intelligimus quid p°nitentia et quid acquiescentia in se ipso sit. Nempe p°nitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui et acquiescentia in se ipso est lætitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt quia homines se liberos esse credunt (vide propositionem 49 hujus).
English (Elwes 1883)
We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him daring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what are Repentance and Self--complacency. Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause; Self--complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
Modern English
We can see, then, that what one person loves another may hate, that what one person fears another may not fear, and that the same person may now love what they once hated and now be bold where they once were afraid. Because everyone judges what is good, bad, better, or worse according to their affects (E3P39S), it follows that people's judgments can vary as widely as their affects. When we compare people with one another, we distinguish them solely by the difference in their affects and give them different names accordingly. I call a person intrepid who despises an evil I am accustomed to fear. If I also notice that their desire to harm those they hate and to benefit those they love is not held back by the kind of fear that holds me back, I call them daring. A person will seem timid to me if they fear an evil I am accustomed to despise; and if their desire is held back by a fear that would not hold me back, I will say they are cowardly. Everyone judges in the same way.
From this natural inconstancy of human judgment, from the fact that people often judge things solely by their affects, and that the things they believe will bring joy or sadness, and therefore strive to promote or remove (E3P28), are often merely imaginary (to say nothing of the uncertainty of things touched on in Part 2), it is easy to see how a person can sometimes be the cause of joy and sometimes of sadness, and so can be affected by joy accompanied by the idea of themselves as cause, or by sadness accompanied by that same idea. Repentance is sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause; self-contentment is joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause. These affects are extremely intense because people believe themselves free (E3P49).