E3P39S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Per bonum hic intelligo omne genus lætitiæ et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit et præcipue id quod desiderio qualecunque illud sit, satisfacit. Per malum autem omne tristitiæ genus et præcipue id quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (in scholio propositionis 9 hujus) ostendimus nos nihil cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra id bonum vocamus quod cupimus et consequenter id quod aversamur malum appellamus; quare unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat seu æstimat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid pejus et quid denique optimum quidve pessimum sit. Sic avarus argenti copiam optimum, ejus autem inopiam pessimum judicat. Ambitiosus autem nihil æque ac gloriam cupit et contra nihil æque ac pudorem reformidat. Invido deinde nihil jucundius quam alterius infelicitas et nihil molestius quam aliena felicitas ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse judicat. Cæterum hic affectus quo homo ita disponitur ut id quod vult nolit vel ut id quod non vult velit, timor vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum quod futurum judicat, minore vitandum (vide propositionem 28 hujus). Sed si malum quod timet pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia. Denique si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali ita ut quid potius velit, nesciat, tum metus vocatur consternatio præcipue si utrumque malum quod timetur ex maximis sit.
English (Elwes 1883)
By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's success. So every man, according to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared be very great.
Modern English
By good I here mean every kind of joy, and everything that conduces to it — especially what satisfies desire, whatever that desire may be. By bad I mean every kind of sadness, especially what frustrates desire. For I showed above (E3P9S) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good; rather, we call something good because we desire it, and call bad whatever we are averse to. Each person therefore, according to his own affect, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, and finally what is best or worst.
The miser judges an abundance of money to be the best thing, and its lack the worst. The ambitious person desires nothing so much as glory and dreads nothing so much as shame. To the envious person, nothing is more pleasant than another's misfortune and nothing more distressing than another's good fortune. So each person, according to his affect, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless.
Now, the affect by which a person is disposed to not want what he wants, or to want what he does not want, is called timidity, which can accordingly be defined as the fear by which a person is induced to avoid a harm he judges to be future by accepting a lesser harm (E3P28). But if the harm feared is shame, timidity is called bashfulness. And if the desire to avoid a future harm is constrained by fear of another harm, so that the person does not know what to prefer, this fear is called consternation, especially when both feared harms are of the greatest kind.