E1P10S
Scholium — Part I
Latin
Ex his apparet quod quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur hoc est unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere ipsa dua entia sive duas diversas substantias constituere; id enim est de natura substantiæ ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur quandoquidem omnia quæ habet attributa, simul in ipsa semper fuerunt nec unum ab alio produci potuit sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiæ exprimit. Longe ergo abest ut absurdum sit uni substantiæ plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat eo plura attributa quæ et necessitatem sive æternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat et consequenter nihil etiam clarius quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut definitione 6 tradidimus) ens quod constat infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit. Si quis autem jam quærit ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quæ ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quæreretur.
English (Elwes 1883)
It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the other--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought in vain.
Modern English
From this it is clear that although two attributes are conceived as really distinct, that is, one without the help of the other, we still cannot conclude that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it belongs to the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it simultaneously, and none could be produced by another. Each one expresses the reality or being of substance.
It is far from absurd, then, to ascribe several attributes to one substance. On the contrary, nothing in nature is clearer than this: every being must be conceived under some attribute, and the more reality or being it has, the more attributes belong to it, attributes that express both necessity (or eternity) and infinity. Nothing, accordingly, is clearer than that an absolutely infinite being must be defined, as we did at (E1D6), as a being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
If anyone now asks by what sign we can recognize the diversity of substances, let them read the propositions that follow. They show that in nature only one substance exists, and that it is absolutely infinite; so that sign would be sought in vain.