E1App
Appendix — Part I
Latin
His Dei naturam ejusque proprietates explicui ut quod necessario existit; quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint prædeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis sive absoluto beneplacito sed ex absoluta Dei natura sive infinita potentia. Porro ubicunque data fuit occasio, præjudicia quæ impedire poterant quominus meæ demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi sed quia non pauca adhuc restant præjudicia quæ etiam imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo, amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operæ pretium duxi. Et quoniam omnia quæ hic indicare suscipio præjudicia pendent ab hoc uno quod scilicet communiter supponant homines omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere, imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere pro certo statuant : dicunt enim Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem ut ipsum coleret. Hoc igitur unum prius considerabo quærendo scilicet primo causam cur plerique hoc in præjudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum. Deinde ejusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem quomodo ex hoc orta sint præjudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate et de aliis hujus generis. Verum hæc ab humanæ mentis natura deducere non est hujus loci : satis hic erit si pro fundamento id capiam quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso nempe hoc quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quærendi, cujus rei sunt conscii. Ex his enim sequitur primo quod homines se liberos esse opinentur quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii et de causis a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari nec per somnium cogitant. Sequitur secundo homines omnia propter finem agere videlicet propter utile quod appetunt; unde fit ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat nisi ut ad semet se convertant et ad fines a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario judicant. Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media quæ ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant ut exempli gratia oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, hinc factum ut omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerent et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt aliquem alium esse qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt easdem se ipsas fecisse sed ex mediis quæ sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt dari aliquem vel aliquos naturæ rectores humana præditos libertate qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint. Atque horum etiam ingenium quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo judicare debuerunt atque hinc statuerunt Deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur; unde factum ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum cæcæ illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiæ dirigeret. Atque ita hoc præjudicium in superstitionem versum et altas in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quæsiverunt ostendere naturam nihil frustra (hoc est quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse quam naturam Deosque æque ac homines delirare. Vide quæso quo res tandem evasit! Inter tot naturæ commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terræ motus, morbos etc. atque hæc statuerunt propterea evenire quod Dii irati essent ob injurias sibi ab hominibus factas sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa et quamvis experientia indies reclamaret ac infinitis exemplis ostenderet commoda atque incommoda piis æque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato præjudicio destiterunt : facilius enim iis fuit hoc inter alia incognita quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic præsentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiæ retinere quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt Deorum judicia humanum captum longissime superare : quæ sane unica fuisset causa ut veritas humanum genus in æternum lateret nisi mathesis, quæ non circa fines sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset et præter mathesin aliæ etiam adsignari possunt causæ (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est) a quibus fieri potuit ut homines communia hæc præjudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur. His satis explicui id quod primo loco promisi. Ut jam autem ostendam naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id jam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis unde hoc præjudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi quam ex propositione 16 et corollariis propositionis 32 et præterea ex iis omnibus quibus ostendi omnia naturæ æterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere. Hoc tamen adhuc addam nempe hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat et contra. Deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius. Et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum. Nam (duobus prioribus omissis quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex propositionibus 21, 22 et 23 constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est qui a Deo immediate producitur et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res quæ immediate a Deo productæ sunt, ea de causa factæ essent ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimæ quarum de causa priores factæ sunt, omnium præstantissimæ essent. Deinde hæc doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit nam si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigentiæ et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse quia nihil ante creationem præter Deum assignare possunt propter quod Deus ageret adeoque necessario fateri coguntur Deum iis propter quæ media parare voluit, caruisse eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum. Nec hic prætereundum est quod hujus doctrinæ sectatores qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile sed ad ignorantiam, quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinæ argumentandi medium. Nam si exempli gratia ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicujus caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse. Ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiæ (sæpe enim multæ simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt? Respondebis fortasse id ex eo quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt, cur ventus illo tempore flavit? Cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas ventum tum ortum quia mare præcedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat, instabunt iterum quia nullus rogandi finis, cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit? et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt donec ad Dei voluntatem hoc est ignorantiæ asylum confugeris. Sic etiam ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo quod tantæ artis causas ignorant, concludunt eandem non mechanica sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari talique modo constitui ut una pars alteram non lædat. Atque hinc fit ut qui miraculorum causas veras quærit quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro hæretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis quos vulgus tanquam naturæ Deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt quod sublata ignorantia stupor hoc est unicum argumentandi tuendæque suæ auctoritatis medium quod habent, tollitur. Sed hæc relinquo et ad id quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo. Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quæ fiunt propter ipsos fieri, id in unaquaque re præcipuum judicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum et illa omnia præstantissima æstimare a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones quibus rerum naturas explicarent scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem et quia se liberos existimant, inde hæ notiones ortæ sunt scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum sed has infra postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum, quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt. Et quia ii qui rerum naturam non intelligunt sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suæque naturæ ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositæ ut cum nobis per sensus repræsentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas, si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas sive confusas esse dicimus. Et quoniam ea nobis præ cæteris grata sunt quæ facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni præferunt quasi ordo aliquid in natura præter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt nisi velint forte Deum humanæ imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis injiciet quod infinita reperiantur quæ nostram imaginationem longe superant et plurima quæ ipsam propter ejus imbecillitatem confundunt. Sed de hac re satis. Cæteræ deinde notiones etiam præter imaginandi modos quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt et tamen ab ignaris tanquam præcipua rerum attributa considerantur quia ut jam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt et rei alicujus naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt prout ab eadem afficiuntur. Exempli gratia si motus quem nervi ab objectis per oculos repræsentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, objecta a quibus causatur pulchra dicuntur, quæ autem contrarium motum cient, deformia. Quæ deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel fætida vocant, quæ per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc. Quæ autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut lævia etc. Et quæ denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt philosophi qui sibi persuaserint motus cælestes harmoniam componere. Quæ omnia satis ostendunt unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus) quod inter homines tot quot experimur, controversiæ ortæ sint ex quibus tandem scepticismus. Nam quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est et sic de cæteris quibus hic supersedeo cum quia hujus loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt. Omnibus enim in ore est "quot capita tot sensus", "suo quemque sensu abundare", "non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina" : quæ sententiæ satis ostendunt homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicare resque potius imaginari quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illæ omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent. Videmus itaque omnes notiones quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi nec ullius rei naturam sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis sed imaginationis voco atque adeo omnia argumenta quæ contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt. Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimæ Dei naturæ sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortæ? Videlicet rerum corruptio ad fætorem usque, rerum deformitas quæ nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc. Sed ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est æstimanda nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectæ sunt propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanæ naturæ conducunt vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem qui quærunt cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda vel magis proprie loquendo quia ipsius naturæ leges adeo amplæ fuerunt ut sufficerent ad omnia quæ ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut propositione 16 demonstravi. Hæc sunt quæ hic notare suscepi præjudicia. Si quædam hujus farinæ adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.
English (Elwes 1883)
In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.
All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self--created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result: among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that God's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the truth.
I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versa: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self--evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God: for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he desired them.
We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. "But why," they will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way?" If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?" So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God--in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another.
Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that, with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my third point.
After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and blame, sin and merit.
I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they have called good, everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are well--ordered; if the contrary, that they are ill--ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion--as though there were any order in nature, except in relation to our imagination--and say that God has created all things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full--flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, &c.
Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds; everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates." All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have urged.
We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.
Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
Modern English
In what precedes I have explained God's nature and properties — that he necessarily exists; that he is unique; that he is and acts solely from the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how; that all things are in God and depend on him in such a way that without him they could neither be nor be conceived; and finally that all things were predetermined by God, not from freedom of will or absolute decree, but from God's absolute nature or infinite power. Along the way, wherever occasion arose, I took care to remove the prejudices that could have impeded the grasp of my demonstrations. But because a good many prejudices remain, prejudices that could and still can very seriously impede human beings from taking up the interconnection of things in the way I have explained it, I have thought it worthwhile to bring those prejudices before the bar of reason here.
All the prejudices I undertake to point out here depend on a single one: the common assumption that all natural things act, as men do, for an end, and that God himself directs everything toward some definite goal, for they say God made everything for man, and man so that he might worship him. I will consider this assumption first, asking: why do so many rest content with this prejudice, and why are all people by nature so inclined to embrace it? Then I will show its falsity, and finally how from it arose the prejudices about good and bad, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and things of that kind. To derive all this from the nature of the human mind is not the business of this place. It will be enough if I take as a foundation what must be conceded by everyone: that all human beings are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek what is useful to them, of which they are conscious.
From these two facts it follows, first, that human beings think themselves free, since they are conscious of their volitions and appetites and do not even dream, being ignorant of the causes that dispose them to want and will as they do. It follows, second, that human beings do everything for an end, namely, for the useful thing they seek. Hence they always want to know only the final causes of completed events, and once they have heard those causes, they are at rest, having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn the causes from others, they have no recourse but to turn to themselves and reflect on the ends by which they are usually determined to act in similar ways, and so they necessarily judge the temperament of others by their own. Beyond this, finding within themselves and outside themselves no few means that are of considerable use in pursuing what is useful, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, they come to regard all natural things as means to their own use. And since they know these means were found by them, not made ready for them, they had reason to believe some other being had prepared these means for their use. For once they looked on things as means, they could not believe those things had made themselves. From the means they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they had to conclude that there was one or several governors of nature endowed with human freedom, who had arranged everything for them and made everything for their use. They were then compelled to judge the character of those governors, having never heard anything about them, by their own, and so they determined that the gods direct everything for human benefit, so that men would be bound to them and hold them in the highest honor. This led each person to devise, according to their own temperament, different ways of honoring God, so that God might love them above the rest and direct all of nature to serve their blind greed and insatiable avarice. This prejudice thus turned into superstition and took deep root in minds. That is what caused everyone to strive with great effort to understand and explain the final causes of all things. But in their zeal to show that nature does nothing in vain, that is, nothing that is not of use to men, they seem only to have shown that nature, the gods, and men are alike deranged. Consider where it all ended up: among nature's many conveniences they were bound to find a good many inconveniences, storms, earthquakes, diseases, and so on, and they decided these occurred because the gods were angry at some injury done to them by men, or at sins committed in their worship. Although experience daily protested and showed by countless examples that good and ill fortune fall to pious and impious alike, they did not abandon their entrenched prejudice. It was easier for them to place these inconveniences among the other unknowns whose use they did not understand, and so to retain their present and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole structure of their reasoning and start fresh. They therefore settled on it as certain that the judgments of the gods far surpass human comprehension, which would surely have caused the truth to remain hidden from humanity forever, had not mathematics, concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, shown people another standard of truth. Besides mathematics, other causes can also be named (which need not be enumerated here) by which it came about that people noticed these common prejudices and were led toward true knowledge of things.
With this I have sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place. To show now that nature has no fixed end and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions, not much is needed. I believe this is already sufficiently established, both from the foundations and causes from which I showed this prejudice traces its origin, and from P16 (E1P16) and the corollaries of P32 (E1P32C1) (E1P32C2), as well as from everything by which I showed that all things in nature proceed with eternal necessity and with the highest perfection. I will add one point: this doctrine of ends entirely overturns nature. For it treats what is truly a cause as an effect, and vice versa. It makes what is by nature prior into what is posterior. And it makes what is supreme and most perfect into the most imperfect. Setting aside the first two points as self-evident, it is clear from P21 (E1P21), P22 (E1P22), and P23 (E1P23) that the effect produced immediately by God is the most perfect, and that the more intermediate causes a thing requires for its production, the more imperfect it is. But if the things produced immediately by God were made so that God could achieve his end, then the last things, for whose sake the first were made, would necessarily be the most excellent of all. Further, this doctrine does away with God's perfection. For if God acts for an end, he necessarily desires something he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nonetheless confess that God did everything for his own sake, not for the sake of the things to be created, since they can assign nothing prior to creation, apart from God himself, for which God should act. They are therefore compelled to admit that God lacked those things for whose attainment he wanted to prepare means, and desired them, as is clear in itself. Nor should we pass over the fact that the adherents of this doctrine, wanting to display their talent in assigning final causes to things, introduced a new method of argument to prove their view, reducing not to the impossible, but to ignorance. This shows there was no other means of argument for this doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof onto someone's head and kills him, they will demonstrate by this method that the stone fell to kill the man. For if it had not fallen with that end at God's will, how could so many circumstances, often many concurring at once, have come together by chance? The answer might be that it happened because the wind was blowing and the man was walking that way. But they will press: why was the wind blowing at that time? Why was the man walking that way at that same time? If the answer is that the wind arose because the sea had begun to be agitated the previous day while the weather was still calm, and the man had been invited by a friend, they will press again, for there is no end to the questioning: why was the sea agitated? why was the man invited at that time? And so they keep asking for cause after cause until at last one takes refuge in God's will, that is, the refuge of ignorance. Similarly, when they see the structure of the human body, they are struck with wonder, and from their ignorance of the causes of so great a work, conclude that it was fashioned not mechanically but by divine or supernatural skill, and constructed in such a way that no part injures another. This is why anyone who seeks the true causes of miracles and strives to understand natural things as a learned person, not to gape at them like a fool, is regularly branded and denounced as a heretic and impious by those whom the common people venerate as interpreters of nature and the gods. For those authorities know that once ignorance is removed, wonder, the sole means of argument and defense of their authority, is removed too. But I leave this and proceed to what I resolved to address in the third place.
Once men persuaded themselves that everything that happens happens for their sake, they had to regard as the chief quality in each thing whatever was most useful to them, and to esteem most highly all the things by which they were best affected. From this they were compelled to form the notions by which they explain the natures of things, good, bad, order, confusion, hot, cold, beauty, and ugliness. And because they consider themselves free, the further notions of praise and blame, sin and merit arose from there. I will speak of the latter below, when I treat human nature; the former I will explain briefly here. They called good all that conduces to health and the worship of God, and bad whatever opposes these. But those who do not understand the nature of things and only imagine them, who affirm nothing about things and take imagination for intellect, firmly believe there is order in things, being ignorant of things and of their own nature. When things are arranged so that when they are presented to us through the senses we can easily imagine them and consequently easily recall them, we say they are well ordered; if the reverse, badly ordered or confused. And since things we can easily imagine are more pleasing to us than others, people prefer order to confusion, as if order were something in nature beyond its relation to our imagination. They say God created everything in an ordered way, and in doing so unwittingly attribute imagination to God, unless perhaps they would have it that God, foreseeing human imagination, arranged all things in the way they could most easily be imagined. Perhaps they would not be troubled by the fact that infinitely many things are found that far exceed our imagination, and very many more that confound it on account of its weakness. But enough on this point. The other notions are nothing beyond modes of imagining, ways in which the imagination is variously affected, and yet the ignorant regard them as the chief attributes of things, because, as I said, they believe all things were made for their sake, and they call a thing's nature good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt, according to how it affects them. For instance, if the motion that objects presented to our eyes communicate to the nerves is conducive to health, those objects are called beautiful; those that cause the contrary motion are called ugly. What acts on our sense of smell is called fragrant or fetid; what acts on our taste, sweet or bitter, flavorful or insipid; what acts on our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth. Finally, what moves our ears is said to produce noise, sound, or harmony, the last of which has so unhinged people that they even came to believe God delights in harmony. There are also philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavenly bodies produce harmony. All of this shows well enough that each person judges things according to the disposition of their brain, or rather takes the affections of their imagination for the things themselves. It is therefore no wonder, to note this in passing, that so many controversies have arisen among people, ending finally in skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many respects, they differ in far more. So what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing to one is displeasing to another, and so on for the rest, which I pass over here, both because this is not the place to treat them at length, and because everyone has experienced this sufficiently. It is on everyone's lips: 'so many heads, so many minds'; 'each person abounds in their own opinion'; 'differences in brains are no fewer than differences in palates.' These sayings show well enough that people judge things according to the disposition of their brain, and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they understood things, those things would, as mathematics attests, at least convince them, even if they did not attract.
We see therefore that all the notions by which common people are accustomed to explain nature are merely modes of imagining and indicate not the nature of any thing but only the constitution of the imagination. And because these notions have names, as if they were beings existing outside the imagination, I call them beings not of reason but of imagination. All arguments brought against us from such notions can therefore be easily repelled. Many argue in this way: if all things followed from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, why are there so many imperfections in nature: things rotting to the point of putrefaction, deformity moving nausea, confusion, bad things, sin, and so on? But as I just said, these are easily refuted. The perfection of things is to be estimated from their nature and power alone. Things are not more or less perfect because they delight or offend human senses, or because they conduce to human nature or are repugnant to it. To those who ask why God did not create all human beings governed solely by the guidance of reason, I answer only this: because material was not lacking to God for creating everything from the highest to the lowest degree of perfection, or, speaking more strictly, because the laws of his nature were broad enough to suffice for producing everything that can be conceived by an infinite intellect, as I demonstrated in P16 (E1P16).
These are the prejudices I undertook to note here. If any of the same kind remain, each person can correct them with a moderate amount of reflection.