E1P32C2
Corollary — Part I
Latin
Sequitur II° voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere ut motus et quies et absolute ut omnia naturalia quæ (per propositionem 29) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere quam propter ea quæ ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur) dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua quæ ostendimus ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequi et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.
English (Elwes 1883)
(not aligned in this witness)
Modern English
It follows, second, that will and intellect stand in the same relation to God's nature as motion and rest, and absolutely as all natural things, which (E1P29) must be determined by God to exist and act in a definite way.
For will, like everything else, requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and act in a definite way. And although infinitely many things may follow from a given will or intellect, God cannot for that reason be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than, because infinitely many things follow from motion and rest, we can say that motion and rest act from freedom of motion and rest. Therefore will no more belongs to God's nature than any other natural thing does. Will stands in the same relation to God's nature as motion and rest and all the rest of what we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature and to be determined by it to exist and act in a definite way.