E4P66S
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Si igitur hæc cum iis conferantur quæ in hac parte usque ad propositionem 18 de affectuum viribus ostendimus, facile videbimus quid homo qui solo affectu seu opinione homini qui ratione ducitur, intersit. Ille enim velit nolit ea quæ maxime ignorat, agit; hic autem nemini nisi sibi morem gerit et ea tantum agit quæ in vita prima esse novit quæque propterea maxime cupit et ideo illum servum, hunc autem liberum voco, de cujus ingenio et vivendi ratione pauca adhuc notare libet.
English (Elwes 1883)
If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.
Modern English
If we compare these results with what we showed about the strength of affects in this Part up through Proposition 18, we can easily see the difference between a person led solely by affect or opinion and a person led by reason. The former acts, willingly or not, on things of which he is utterly ignorant. The latter answers to no one but himself and does only what he knows to be of primary importance in life — what he therefore most desires. I call the former a slave and the latter a free man. A few observations about the free man's character and way of life are worth adding.