E4P45S2

Scholium — Part IV

Latin

Inter irrisionem (quam in I corollario malam esse dixi) et risum magnam agnosco differentiam. Nam risus ut et jocus mera est lætitia adeoque modo excessum non habeat, per se bonus est (per propositionem 41 hujus). Nihil profecto nisi torva et tristis superstitio delectari prohibet. Nam qui magis decet famem et sitim extinguere quam melancholiam expellere? Mea hæc est ratio et sic animum induxi meum. Nullum numen nec alius nisi invidus mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur nec nobis lacrimas, singultus, metum et alia hujusmodi quæ animi impotentis sunt signa, virtuti ducit sed contra quo majore lætitia afficimur eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus hoc est eo nos magis de natura divina participare necesse est. Rebus itaque uti et iis quantum fieri potest delectari (non quidem ad nauseam usque nam hoc delectari non est) viri est sapientis. Viri inquam sapientis est moderato et suavi cibo et potu se reficere et recreare ut et odoribus, plantarum virentium amœnitate, ornatu, musica, ludis exercitatoriis, theatris et aliis hujusmodi quibus unusquisque absque ullo alterius damno uti potest. Corpus namque humanum ex plurimis diversæ naturæ partibus componitur quæ continuo novo alimento indigent et vario ut totum corpus ad omnia quæ ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, æque aptum sit et consequenter ut mens etiam æque apta sit ad plura simul intelligendum. Hoc itaque vivendi institutum et cum nostris principiis et cum communi praxi optime convenit; quare si quæ alia, hæc vivendi ratio optima est et omnibus modis commendanda nec opus est de his clarius neque prolixius agere.

English (Elwes 1883)

(not aligned in this witness)

Modern English

I recognize a great difference between mockery — which I called bad in Corollary I — and laughter. Laughter, like joking, is pure joy; and so, as long as it does not run to excess, it is good in itself (E4P41). Nothing but grim and gloomy superstition forbids enjoyment. Why should it be more fitting to appease hunger and thirst than to drive away melancholy? My own reasoning, and the conviction I have reached, is this: no deity, and no one except the envious, takes pleasure in my weakness and distress; nor does anyone count tears, sobs, fear, and the like — which are signs of a weak mind — as virtue. On the contrary, the greater the joy by which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass — that is, the more we necessarily participate in the divine nature. Therefore to use what comes to hand, and to enjoy it as much as possible — not to the point of disgust, for that is no longer enjoyment — belongs to the wise person.

It belongs to the wise person, I say, to refresh and restore themselves with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and with fragrance, with the beauty of growing plants, with fine clothing, with music, with sports, with the theatre, and with all such things as each person may enjoy without harm to another. For the human body is composed of very many parts of different natures that continually need fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally fit to do everything that can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind may also be equally fit to understand many things at once. This way of life, then, agrees best both with our principles and with common practice. If any other plan were in question, this one is the best and deserves commendation in every respect. There is no need to treat the matter more plainly or at greater length.

Depends on (1)

Propositions