E4P12D2
Demonstration — Part IV
Latin
Affectus erga rem quam in præsenti existere imaginamur, intensior est quam si eandem ut futuram imaginaremur (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) et multo vehementior est quam si tempus futurum a præsenti multum distare imaginaremur (per propositionem 10 hujus). Est itaque affectus erga rem cujus existendi tempus longe a præsenti distare imaginamur, multo remissior quam si eandem ut præsentem imaginaremur et nihilominus (per propositionem præcedentem) intensior est quam si eandem rem ut contingentem imaginaremur atque adeo affectus erga rem contingentem multo remissior erit quam si rem in præsenti nobis adesse imaginaremur. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV. x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is, nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.
Modern English
An affect toward a thing we imagine to exist in the present is more intense than it would be if we imagined that thing as future (E4P9C), and far more vehement than if we imagined the future time as distant from the present (E4P10). An affect toward a thing whose time of existence we imagine to be far removed from the present is therefore far weaker than if we imagined that thing as present. Yet it is nonetheless more intense than if we imagined the same thing as contingent (E4P10). Therefore an affect toward a contingent thing is far weaker than it would be if we imagined that thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.