E3Pref
Preface — Part III
Latin
Plerique qui de affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus quæ communes naturæ leges sequuntur sed de rebus quæ extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturæ ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanæ deinde impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causam non communi naturæ potentiæ sed nescio cui naturæ humanæ vitio tribuunt quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur et qui humanæ mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur. Non defuerunt tamen viri præstantissimi (quorum labori et industriæ nos multum debere fatemur) qui de recta vivendi ratione præclara multa scripserint et plena prudentiæ consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo quod sciam determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam crediderit mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare simulque viam ostendere studuisse qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium sed mea quidem sententia nihil præter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt quam intelligere. His sine dubio mirum videbitur quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea quæ rationi repugnare quæque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea hæc est ratio. Nihil in natura fit quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia hoc est naturæ leges et regulæ secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eædem atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcunque naturam intelligendi nempe per leges et regulas naturæ universales. Affectus itaque odii, iræ, invidiæ etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturæ necessitate et virtute consequuntur ac reliqua singularia ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt per quas intelliguntur certasque proprietates habent cognitione nostra æque dignas ac proprietates cujuscunque alterius rei cujus sola contemplatione delectamur. De affectuum itaque natura et viribus ac mentis in eosdem potentia eadem methodo agam qua in præcedentibus de Deo et mente egi et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde ac si quæstio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.
English (Elwes 1883)
ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their restraint.
I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.
Modern English
Most writers on affects and human conduct seem to be treating things outside nature rather than natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive of man as a kingdom within a kingdom. They believe that man disturbs nature's order more than he follows it, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human weakness and inconstancy not to the common power of nature but to some mysterious flaw in human nature — and accordingly they bewail, mock, despise, or usually detest it. One who can reproach the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more sharply is regarded as nearly divine.
There has been no lack of excellent men whose toil and industry we acknowledge as a great debt to us — men who have written many fine things about the right way to live and given people much sound advice. But no one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and strength of the affects and what the mind can do against them in moderating them.
I know that the celebrated Descartes, though he believed the mind has absolute power over its actions, still set out to explain human affects through their primary causes and at the same time to show a way by which the mind could have absolute dominion over them. In my judgment, however, he accomplished nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.
I want to return now to those who prefer to detest or mock human affects and actions rather than understand them. To such people it will doubtless seem strange that I should undertake to treat human vices and follies geometrically, and that I should wish to demonstrate by sure reasoning the things they proclaim repugnant to reason, futile, absurd, and dreadful. But this is my plan.
Nothing comes to pass in nature that can be attributed to a flaw in it. Nature is always the same, and its power and capacity for action is everywhere one and the same, that is, the laws and rules of nature, by which all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same. So there must also be one and the same method of understanding the nature of things of any kind whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules.
The affects of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and power of nature as everything else that exists. They have determinate causes through which they are understood, and they possess definite properties as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing whose contemplation alone gives us delight. I will therefore treat of the nature and strength of the affects, and the power of the mind over them, by the same method I used in my previous investigations concerning God and the mind. I will consider human actions and appetites exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and solids.