E3P47S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Potest hæc propositio etiam demonstrari ex corollario propositionis 17 partis II. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut præsentem contemplamur corpusque eodem modo afficitur; quare quatenus rei memoria viget eatenus homo determinatur ad eandem cum tristitia contemplandum; quæ determinatio manente adhuc rei imagine coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum quæ hujus existentiam secludunt sed non tollitur atque adeo homo eatenus tantum lætatur quatenus hæc determinatio coercetur et hinc fit ut hæc lætitia quæ ex rei quam odimus malo oritur, toties repetatur quoties ejusdem rei recordamur. Nam uti diximus quando ejusdem rei imago excitatur, quia hæc ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem tristitia contemplandum qua eandem contemplari solebat cum ipsa existeret. Sed quia ejusdem rei imagini alias junxit quæ ejusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo hæc ad tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur et homo de novo lætatur et hoc toties quoties hæc repetitio fit. Atque hæc eadem est causa cur homines lætantur quoties alicujus jam præteriti mali recordantur et cur pericula a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur et ad id metuendum determinantur, quæ determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis quam hujus periculi ideæ junxerunt cum ab eodem liberati sunt quæque eos de novo securos reddit atque adeo de novo lætantur.
English (Elwes 1883)
This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.
Modern English
This proposition can also be demonstrated from the Corollary to Proposition 17 of Part 2 (E2P17C). Whenever we recall a thing — even when it no longer actually exists — we contemplate it as if present, and the body is affected in the same way. Accordingly, for as long as the memory of the thing is vivid, a person is determined to contemplate it with sadness. That determination is checked, while the image of the thing persists, by the memory of other things that exclude its existence, but it is not destroyed. So a person rejoices only to the extent that the determination is checked — and this is why the joy arising from harm done to what we hate is renewed each time we recall that object.
When the image of the hated thing is aroused, it involves the thing's existence and thereby determines the person to contemplate it with the same sadness as before. But since other images have been joined to it that exclude its existence, the determination toward sadness is at once checked and the person rejoices afresh — and this happens as often as the recollection recurs.
This is also the reason why people rejoice when they recall past evils, and why they delight in telling of dangers from which they have escaped. When someone imagines a danger, they contemplate it as still impending and are determined to fear it. That determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom they associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped it, which makes them feel secure again — and so they rejoice again.