E3P2S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Hæc clarius intelliguntur ex iis quæ in scholio propositionis 7 partis II dicta sunt quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit quæ jam sub cogitationis jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Unde fit ut ordo sive rerum concatenatio una sit sive natura sub hoc sive sub illo attributo concipiatur, consequenter ut ordo actionum et passionum corporis nostri simul sit natura cum ordine actionum et passionum mentis : quod etiam patet ex modo quo propositionem 12 partis II demonstravimus. At quamvis hæc ita se habeant ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad hæc æquo animo perpendendum adeo firmiter persuasi sunt corpus ex solo mentis nutu jam moveri jam quiescere plurimaque agere quæ a sola mentis voluntate et excogitandi arte pendent. Etenim quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit hoc est neminem hucusque experientia docuit quid corpus ex solis legibus naturæ quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere et quid non possit nisi a mente determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque corporis fabricam tam accurate novit ut omnes ejus functiones potuerit explicare ut jam taceam quod in brutis plura observentur quæ humanam sagacitatem longe superant et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant quæ vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit ipsum corpus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus multa posse quæ ipsius mens admiratur. Deinde nemo scit qua ratione quibusve mediis mens moveat corpus neque quot motus gradus possit corpori tribuere quantaque cum celeritate idem movere queat. Unde sequitur cum homines dicunt hanc vel illam actionem corporis oriri a mente quæ imperium in corpus habet, eos nescire quid dicant nec aliud agere quam speciosis verbis fateri se veram illius actionis causam absque admiratione ignorare. At dicent sive sciant sive nesciant quibus mediis mens moveat corpus, se tamen experiri quod nisi mens humana apta esset ad excogitandum, corpus iners esset. Deinde se experiri in sola mentis potestate esse tam loqui quam tacere et alia multa quæ proinde a mentis decreto pendere credunt. Sed quod ad primum attinet, ipsos rogo num experientia non etiam doceat quod si contra corpus iners sit, mens simul ad cogitandum sit inepta? Nam cum corpus somno quiescit, mens simul cum ipso sopita manet nec potestatem habet veluti cum vigilat, excogitandi. Deinde omnes expertos esse credo mentem non semper æque aptam esse ad cogitandum de eodem objecto sed prout corpus aptius est ut in eo hujus vel illius objecti imago excitetur, ita mentem aptiorem esse ad hoc vel illud objectum contemplandum. At dicent ex solis legibus naturæ quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, fieri non posse ut causæ ædificiorum, picturarum rerumque hujusmodi quæ sola humana arte fiunt, possint deduci nec corpus humanum nisi a mente determinaretur ducereturque, pote esset ad templum aliquod ædificandum. Verum ego jam ostendi ipsos nescire quid corpus possit quidve ex sola ipsius naturæ contemplatione possit deduci ipsosque plurima experiri ex solis naturæ legibus fieri quæ nunquam credidissent posse fieri nisi ex mentis directione ut sunt ea quæ somnambuli in somnis agunt quæque ipsi, dum vigilant, admirantur. Addo hic ipsam corporis humani fabricam quæ artificio longissime superat omnes quæ humana arte fabricatæ sunt, ut jam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex natura sub quovis attributo considerata, infinita sequi. Quod porro ad secundum attinet, sane longe felicius sese res humanæ haberent si æque in hominis potestate esset tam tacere quam loqui. At experientia satis superque docet homines nihil minus in potestate habere quam linguam nec minus posse quam appetitus moderari suos; unde factum ut plerique credant nos ea tantum libere agere quæ leviter petimus quia earum rerum appetitus facile contrahi potest memoria alterius rei cujus frequenter recordamur sed illa minime quæ magno cum affectu petimus et qui alterius rei memoria sedari nequit. Verumenimvero nisi experti essent nos plura agere quorum postea pænitet nosque sæpe, quando scilicet contrariis affectibus conflictamur, meliora videre et deteriora sequi, nihil impediret quominus crederent nos omnia libere agere. Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui quæ postea sobrius vellet tacuisse : sic delirans, garrula, puer et hujus farinæ plurimi ex libero mentis decreto credunt loqui cum tamen loquendi impetum quem habent, continere nequeant, ita ut ipsa experientia non minus clare quam ratio doceat quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse credant quia suarum actionum sunt conscii et causarum a quibus determinantur, ignari et præterea quod mentis decreta nihil sint præter ipsos appetitus, quæ propterea varia sunt pro varia corporis dispositione. Nam unusquisque ex suo affectu omnia moderatur et qui præterea contrariis affectibus conflictantur, quid velint nesciunt; qui autem nullo, facili momento huc atque illuc pelluntur. Quæ omnia profecto clare ostendunt mentis tam decretum quam appetitum et corporis determinationem simul esse natura vel potius unam eandemque rem quam quando sub cogitationis attributo consideratur et per ipsum explicatur, decretum appellamus et quando sub extensionis attributo consideratur et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, determinationem vocamus; quod adhuc clarius ex jam dicendis patebit. Nam aliud est quod hic apprime notari vellem nempe quod nos nihil ex mentis decreto agere possumus nisi ejus recordemur. Exempli gratia non possumus verbum loqui nisi ejusdem recordemur. Deinde in libera mentis potestate non est rei alicujus recordari vel ejusdem oblivisci. Quare hoc tantum in mentis potestate esse creditur quod rem cujus recordamur vel tacere vel loqui ex solo mentis decreto possumus. Verum cum nos loqui somniamus, credimus nos ex libero mentis decreto loqui nec tamen loquimur vel si loquimur, id ex corporis spontaneo motu fit. Somniamus deinde nos quædam homines celare idque eodem mentis decreto quo dum vigilamus ea quæ scimus, tacemus. Somniamus denique nos ex mentis decreto quædam agere quæ dum vigilamus non audemus atque adeo pervelim scire an in mente duo decretorum genera dentur, phantasticorum unum et liberorum alterum? Quod si eo usque insanire non libet, necessario concedendum est hoc mentis decretum quod liberum esse creditur, ab ipsa imaginatione sive memoria non distingui nec aliud esse præter illam affirmationem quam idea quatenus idea est, necessario involvit (vide propositionem 49 partis II). Atque adeo hæc mentis decreta eadem necessitate in mente oriuntur ac ideæ rerum actu existentium. Qui igitur credunt se ex libero mentis decreto loqui vel tacere vel quicquam agere, oculis apertis somniant.
English (Elwes 1883)
This is made more clear by what was said in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved II. xii.
Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake: these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.
Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.
But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we have experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's decree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.
But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of building a single temple. However, I have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore vary according to the varying state of the body. Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish; those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that. All these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so. Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. Therefore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly, we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something, which we should not dare to do when awake.
Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open.
Modern English
These things are understood more clearly from what was said in the scholium to E2P7 (E2P7S): mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of thought and then under the attribute of extension. Hence the order or connection of things is the same whether nature is conceived under the one attribute or the other, and consequently the order of actions and passions in our body is simultaneous by nature with the order of actions and passions in the mind. This is also evident from the way in which we demonstrated E2P12 (E2P12).
Still, though this is so and there is no further room for doubt, I can hardly believe, until experience confirms it, that men can be brought to consider these matters calmly. They are so firmly persuaded that the body moves or rests at the mind's mere bidding and performs many actions that depend solely on the mind's will and its art of thinking. No one, however, has yet determined what the body can do, that is, experience has not yet taught anyone what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, considered as merely corporeal, and what it cannot do unless determined by the mind. No one has yet come to know the body's structure so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions; nor need I point out that many actions are observed in animals which far surpass human sagacity, and that sleepwalkers in sleep do many things they would not dare do when awake. These examples are enough to show that the body by the sole laws of its nature can do many things that the mind itself finds astonishing.
Again, no one knows by what means or through what channels the mind moves the body, or how many degrees of speed it can impart to the body, or how quickly it can set it in motion. Hence when people say that this or that bodily action arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not know what they are saying. They are doing nothing more than confessing in plausible-sounding words that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action, and find nothing astonishing in their ignorance.
But, they will say: whether or not we know by what means the mind moves the body, we know by experience that unless the human mind is fit for thinking, the body lies inert. And we know by experience that it lies solely in the mind's power whether to speak or keep silent, and many similar things, which therefore seem to depend on the mind's decree. As for the first claim, I ask them whether experience does not also teach that if the body is inert, the mind is simultaneously unfit for thinking. When the body rests in sleep, the mind rests with it and lacks the power of thinking it has when awake. Again, everyone has found, I think, that the mind is not always equally fit to think about the same object, but is more or less fit to contemplate this or that object according as the body is more or less fit to have the image of it excited in it.
But they will insist: from the sole laws of nature considered as merely corporeal, it is impossible to derive the causes of buildings, paintings, and things of that sort, things produced only by human art, and the human body, if not determined and guided by the mind, could not build a single temple. I have already shown, however, that they do not know what the body can do or what can be deduced from the contemplation of its nature alone; and they have themselves experienced that many things arise from the laws of nature alone that they would never have believed possible without the direction of the mind, such as the things sleepwalkers do in their sleep, which astonish them when they are awake. I would add here the very structure of the human body, which in its artifice far surpasses anything fashioned by human craft, not to repeat what I have already shown: that from nature considered under any attribute whatsoever, infinite things follow.
As for the second claim: the condition of humanity would be far happier if it were equally in human power to keep silent as it is to speak. Experience shows abundantly enough that humans have nothing less in their power than their tongue, and can govern nothing less easily than their appetites. From this it has come about that most people believe we act freely only in what we seek mildly, things whose appetite can easily be restrained by the thought of something else we frequently recall, but that we are by no means free with respect to what we seek with strong affect, since that desire cannot be allayed by the recollection of anything else.
However, if such people had not already experienced that we often do things we later regret, and that we often, when torn between contrary affects, see the better course and follow the worse, nothing would stop them from believing that we act freely in all things. So an infant believes it freely desires milk; an angry child believes it freely desires revenge; a timid one believes it freely desires to flee. A drunk man believes he speaks from the mind's free decree what, once sober, he would have wished he had kept silent. A delirious person, a gossip, a child, and many others of that sort believe they speak from the mind's free decree, even though they cannot restrain the impulse to talk. Experience thus teaches, no less clearly than reason, that humans believe themselves free for this reason alone: they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. And beyond this, the mind's decrees are nothing but the appetites themselves, and therefore vary with the varying state of the body. For each person governs everything according to their affect; those torn by contrary affects do not know what they want; those assailed by no affect are easily pushed this way and that.
All this clearly shows that both the mind's decree and the appetite, and the body's determination, are one and the same in nature, or rather, they are one and the same thing: when considered under the attribute of thought and explained through it, we call it a decree; when considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call it a determination. This will appear still more clearly from what I am about to say. For there is another point I particularly want to note here: we cannot act by the mind's decree without remembering it. For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering it. And it is not in the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. Therefore the mind's power is thought to extend only to this: that from its decree alone, we can speak or keep silent about what we remember. But when we dream that we speak, we believe we speak from the mind's free decree, yet we do not speak, or if we do, it happens through a spontaneous movement of the body. Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act from the same decree of the mind whereby, when awake, we keep silent about what we know. We even dream that from the mind's decree we do things we would not dare do when awake.
Now I should like to know whether there are in the mind two kinds of decrees, one imaginary and one free. If our folly does not extend that far, we must grant that the mind's decree, believed to be free, is indistinguishable from imagination or memory, and is nothing other than the affirmation that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves (E2P49). Those decisions of the mind thus arise in the mind with the same necessity as the ideas of actually existing things. Those who believe they speak, keep silent, or act in any way from the mind's free decree are dreaming with their eyes open.