E2P7S
Scholium — Part II
Latin
Hic antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id quod supra ostendimus nempe quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam substantiæ essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia quæ jam sub hoc jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res sed duobus modis expressa, quod quidam Hebræorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt Deum, Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Exempli gratia circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis quæ etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res quæ per diversa attributa explicatur et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis sive sub attributo cogitationis sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus. Nec ulla alia de causa dixi quod Deus sit causa ideæ exempli gratia circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa nisi quia esse formale ideæ circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum tanquam causam proximam et ille iterum per alium et sic in infinitum, potest percipi ita ut quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturæ sive causarum connexionem per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturæ per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet et idem de aliis attributis intelligo. Quare rerum ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa quatenus infinitis constat attributis nec impræsentiarum hæc clarius possum explicare.
English (Elwes 1883)
Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.
Modern English
Before going further, we should recall what was shown above: that whatever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance belongs entirely to one substance alone. Consequently, thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, grasped now through one attribute, now through the other. So too a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two ways. Some among the Hebrews seem to have seen this, albeit dimly: those who held that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are one and the same.
For example: a circle that exists in nature and the idea of that existing circle, which idea also exists in God, are one and the same thing explained through different attributes. Whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we find one and the same order, one and the same connection of causes, that is, the same things following in each case.
I said that God is the cause of the idea of a circle, for example, only insofar as he is a thinking thing, and the cause of the circle only insofar as he is an extended thing. This is because the formal being of the idea of the circle can only be perceived through another mode of thinking as its proximate cause, and that mode through another, and so on to infinity. Thus, as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of all of nature, the whole connection of causes, through the attribute of thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of all of nature must likewise be explained through the attribute of extension alone. The same holds for every other attribute. Consequently, God is truly the cause of things as they are in themselves insofar as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot explain this more clearly for now.