E5P5D
Demonstration — Part V
Latin
Affectus erga rem quam liberam esse imaginamur, major est quam erga necessariam (per propositionem 49 partis III) et consequenter adhuc major quam erga illam quam ut possibilem vel contingentem imaginamur (per propositionem 11 partis IV). At rem aliquam ut liberam imaginari nihil aliud esse potest quam quod rem simpliciter imaginamur dum causas a quibus ipsa ad agendum determinata fuit, ignoramus (per illa quæ in scholio propositionis 35 partis II ostendimus); ergo affectus erga rem quam simpliciter imaginamur, cæteris paribus major est quam erga necessariam, possibilem vel contingentem et consequenter maximus. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
Modern English
An affect toward a thing we conceive as free is greater than one toward a thing we conceive as necessary (E3P49), and consequently still greater than one toward a thing we conceive as possible or contingent (E4P11). To conceive a thing as free, however, can be nothing other than conceiving it simply while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to act (E2P35S). Therefore an affect toward a thing we conceive simply is, all else being equal, greater than one toward a thing we conceive as necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.