E5P39S

Scholium — Part V

Latin

Quia corpora humana ad plurima apta sunt, non dubium est quin ejus naturæ possint esse ut ad mentes referantur quæ magnam sui et Dei habeant cognitionem et quarum maxima seu præcipua pars est æterna atque adeo ut mortem vix timeant. Sed ut hæc clarius intelligantur, animadvertendum hic est quod nos in continua vivimus variatione et prout in melius sive in pejus mutamur, eo felices aut infelices dicimur. Qui enim ex infante vel puero in cadaver transiit, infelix dicitur et contra id felicitati tribuitur, quod totum vitæ spatium mente sana in corpore sano percurrere potuerimus. Et revera qui corpus habet ut infans vel puer ad paucissima aptum et maxime pendens a causis externis, mentem habet quæ in se sola considerata nihil fere sui nec Dei nec rerum sit conscia et contra qui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, mentem habet quæ in se sola considerata multum sui et Dei et rerum sit conscia. In hac vita igitur apprime conamur ut corpus infantiæ in aliud quantum ejus natura patitur eique conducit, mutetur quod ad plurima aptum sit quodque ad mentem referatur quæ sui et Dei et rerum plurimum sit conscia atque ita ut id omne quod ad ipsius memoriam vel imaginationem refertur, in respectu ad intellectum vix alicujus sit momenti, ut in scholio propositionis præcedentis jam dixi.

English (Elwes 1883)

Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.

For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the last Proposition.

Modern English

Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, there is no doubt that they can be of such a nature as to be referred to minds that have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whose greatest or chief part is eternal, and accordingly, that they scarcely fear death.

But so that this may be understood more clearly, it should be noted here that we live in continual change, and are called happy or unhappy as we change for the better or the worse. One who passes from infancy or childhood to a corpse is called unhappy; and on the other hand it is counted as happiness that we were able to run through the whole span of life with a sound mind in a sound body.

In truth, one who has a body as incapable of action as an infant's or a child's, depending for the most part on external causes, has a mind that, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself, or of God, or of things. Conversely, one who has a body capable of many activities has a mind that, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things.

In this life, therefore, we strive above all to bring it about that the body of infancy is transformed, as far as its nature permits and is conducive to it, into another, one capable of many activities and referable to a mind that is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. And we desire so to transform it that what pertains to memory or imagination, in comparison with the intellect, is of little moment, as I have already said in the scholium of the preceding proposition.