E4P62S
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Si nos de rerum duratione adæquatam cognitionem habere earumque existendi tempora ratione determinare possemus, eodem affectu res futuras ac præsentes contemplaremur et bonum quod mens ut futurum conciperet, perinde ac præsens appeteret et consequenter bonum præsens minus pro majore bono futuro necessario negligeret et quod in præsenti bonum esset sed causa futuri alicujus mali, minime appeteret, ut mox demonstrabimus. Sed nos de duratione rerum (per propositionem 31 partis II) non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus et rerum existendi tempora (per scholium propositionis 44 partis II) sola imaginatione determinamus quæ non æque afficitur imagine rei præsentis ac futuræ; unde fit ut vera boni et mali cognitio quam habemus non nisi abstracta sive universalis sit et judicium quod de rerum ordine et causarum nexu facimus ut determinare possimus quid nobis in præsenti bonum aut malum sit, sit potius imaginarium quam reale atque adeo mirum non est si cupiditas quæ ex boni et mali cognitione quatenus hæc futurum prospicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate quæ in præsentia suaves sunt, coerceri potest, de quo vide propositionem 16 hujus partis.
English (Elwes 1883)
If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II. xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. xvi.)
Modern English
If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things and determine by reason the times of their existence, we would regard future things with the same affect as present ones. The mind would then desire the good it conceived as future just as it desires the good it conceives as present, and would consequently neglect a lesser present good for the sake of a greater future good. It would also not desire what is good in the present but the cause of some future bad — as we will show presently.
But we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (E2P31), and we determine the times of their existence by imagination alone (E2P44S), which is not equally affected by the image of a present thing and a future thing. Hence it happens that the true knowledge of good and bad we possess is only abstract or general, and the judgment we make about the order of things and the connection of causes — in order to determine what is good or bad for us in the present — is more imaginary than real. It is therefore no wonder that desire arising from knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this knowledge looks to the future, can more easily be checked by desire for things that are pleasant in the present. See Proposition 16 of this Part (E4P16).