E4P59S
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Explicantur hæc clarius exemplo. Nempe verberandi actio quatenus physice consideratur et ad hoc tantum attendimus quod homo brachium tollit, manum claudit totumque brachium vi deorsum movet, virtus est quæ ex corporis humani fabrica concipitur. Si itaque homo ira vel odio commotus determinatur ad claudendam manum vel brachium movendum, id ut in parte secunda ostendimus, fit quia una eademque actio potest jungi quibuscunque rerum imaginibus atque adeo tam ex iis imaginibus rerum quas confuse quam quas clare et distincte concipimus, ad unam eandemque actionem determinari possumus. Apparet itaque quod omnis cupiditas quæ ex affectu qui passio est, oritur, nullius esset usus si homines ratione duci possent. Videamus jam cur cupiditas quæ ex affectu qui passio est, oritur, cæca a nobis appellatur.
English (Elwes 1883)
An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind.
Modern English
An example will make this clearer. The act of striking, considered in purely physical terms — attending only to the fact that a person raises his arm, closes his fist, and brings the whole arm down with force — is a power conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If a person, moved by anger or hatred, is determined to close his fist or move his arm, this happens — as we showed in Part II — because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things. We can therefore be determined to one and the same action by ideas we have confusedly, or by ideas we have clearly and distinctly.
It is thus clear that every desire arising from an affect that is a passion would be useless if people could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire arising from such an affect is called blind by us.