E4P58S
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Vana quæ dicitur gloria est acquiescentia in se ipso quæ sola vulgi opinione fovetur eaque cessante cessat ipsa acquiescentia hoc est (per scholium propositionis 52 hujus) summum bonum quod unusquisque amat; unde fit ut qui vulgi opinione gloriatur, quotidiana cura anxius nitatur, faciat, experiatur ut famam conservet. Est namque vulgus varius et inconstans atque adeo nisi conservetur fama, cito abolescit; imo quia omnes vulgi captare applausus cupiunt, facile unusquisque alterius famam reprimit, ex quo quandoquidem de summo quod æstimatur bono certatur, ingens libido oritur se invicem quocunque modo opprimendi et qui tandem victor evadit, gloriatur magis quod alteri obfuit quam quod sibi profuit. Est igitur hæc gloria seu acquiescentia revera vana quia nulla est. Quæ de pudore notanda sunt, colliguntur facile ex iis quæ de misericordia et pœnitentia diximus. Hoc tantum addo quod ut commiseratio sic etiam pudor quamvis non sit virtus, bonus tamen est quatenus indicat homini qui pudore suffunditur, cupiditatem inesse honeste vivendi, sicut dolor qui eatenus bonus dicitur quatenus indicat partem læsam nondum esse putrefactam; quare quamvis homo quem facti alicujus pudet, revera sit tristis, est tamen perfectior impudenti qui nullam habet honeste vivendi cupiditatem. Atque hæc sunt quæ de affectibus lætitiæ et tristitiæ notare susceperam. Ad cupiditates quod attinet, hæ sane bonæ aut malæ sunt quatenus ex bonis aut malis affectibus oriuntur. Sed omnes revera quatenus ex affectibus qui passiones sunt in nobis ingenerantur, cæcæ sunt (ut facile colligitur ex iis quæ in scholio propositionis 44 hujus diximus) nec ullius usus essent si homines facile duci possent ut ex solo rationis dictamine viverent, ut jam paucis ostendam.
English (Elwes 1883)
Empty honour, as it is styled, is self--approval, fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval, in other words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note); consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being nothing.
The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no desire to live honourably.
Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.
Modern English
What is called vainglory is self-approval that is sustained only by the opinion of the crowd. When that opinion stops, the self-approval stops too — that is (E4P52S), the highest good each person loves. So a man who glories in popular opinion strives anxiously day by day to maintain his reputation. For the crowd is changeable and fickle, and a reputation that is not kept up quickly dies away. What is more, since everyone wants to capture popular praise, each person readily suppresses the fame of others. Because they are competing for what they take to be the highest good, an intense desire arises to crush rivals by any means, and whoever comes out victorious in the end glories more in having harmed another than in having done good for himself. This kind of honour, then, is genuinely empty — it is nothing.
What is worth noting about shame can easily be gathered from what we said about compassion and repentance. I will only add this: just as compassion, shame too, though not a virtue, is good insofar as it shows that the man who feels shame has a desire to live honestly — just as pain is called good insofar as it shows that the injured part has not yet become gangrenous. So even though a man who is ashamed of some action is genuinely sad, he is more perfect than the shameless person who has no desire to live honestly.
These are the things I undertook to note about the affects of joy and sadness. As for desires, they are good or bad insofar as they arise from good or bad affects. But all of them, insofar as they are produced in us by affects that are passions, are blind (as can easily be gathered from what I said in the Scholium to Proposition 44 of this Part (E4P44S)), and would be of no use if human beings could easily be led to live by the guidance of reason alone — as I will now show briefly.