E4P34S
Scholium — Part IV
Latin
Dixi quod Paulus odio Petrum habeat quia imaginatur id eundem possidere quod ipse Paulus etiam amat; unde prima fronte videtur sequi quod hi duo ex eo quod idem amant et consequenter ex eo quod natura conveniunt, sibi invicem damno sint atque adeo si hoc verum est, falsæ essent propositio 30 et 31 hujus partis. Sed si rem æqua lance examinare velimus, hæc omnia convenire omnino videbimus. Nam hi duo non sunt invicem molesti quatenus natura conveniunt hoc est quatenus uterque idem amat, sed quatenus ab invicem discrepant. Nam quatenus uterque idem amat, eo ipso utriusque amor fovetur (per propositionem 31 partis III) hoc est (per definitionem 6 affectuum) eo ipso utriusque lætitia fovetur. Quare longe abest ut quatenus idem amant et natura conveniunt, invicem molesti sint. Sed hujus rei causa ut dixi nulla alia est quam quia natura discrepare supponuntur. Supponimus namque Petrum ideam habere rei amatæ jam possessæ et Paulum contra ideam rei amatæ amissæ. Unde fit ut hic tristitia et ille contra lætitia afficiatur atque eatenus invicem contrarii sint. Et ad hunc modum ostendere facile possumus reliquas odii causas ab hoc solo pendere quod homines natura discrepant et non ab eo in quo conveniunt.
English (Elwes 1883)
I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way; if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.
Modern English
I said that Paul hates Peter because he imagines that Peter possesses what Paul himself also loves. At first glance this seems to imply that these two men, precisely because they love the same thing and so agree in nature, are harmful to one another — which would make E4P30 and E4P31 false.
But if we examine the matter squarely, we will see that there is no conflict. These two men are not troublesome to one another in virtue of agreeing in nature, that is, in virtue of both loving the same thing. Rather, they are troublesome in virtue of differing. For in so far as each loves the same thing, that love is fostered in each (E3P31), that is, (E3DA6), each one's joy is thereby fostered. So they are far from being at odds in virtue of loving the same thing and agreeing in nature.
The only cause of their conflict, as I said, is that they are assumed to differ in nature. We suppose Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, and Paul the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence one is affected with joy and the other with sadness, and to that extent they are contrary to one another. We can show in the same way that all other causes of hatred depend solely on difference in nature among men, and not on what they have in common.