E4P1D
Demonstration — Part IV
Latin
Falsitas in sola privatione cognitionis quam ideæ inadæquatæ involvunt, consistit (per propositionem 35 partis II) nec ipsæ aliquid habent positivum propter quod falsæ dicuntur (per propositionem 33 partis II) sed contra quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt (per propositionem 32 partis II). Si igitur id quod idea falsa positivum habet præsentia veri quatenus verum est, tolleretur, tolleretur ergo idea vera a se ipsa, quod (per propositionem 4 partis III) est absurdum. Ergo nihil quod idea etc. Q.E.D.
English (Elwes 1883)
Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false (II. xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God, they are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c. Q.E.D.
Modern English
Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge that inadequate ideas involve (E2P35), and they have nothing positive on account of which they are called false (E2P33); on the contrary, insofar as they are referred to God, they are true (E2P32). If, therefore, the positive content of a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true insofar as it is true, then a true idea would be removed by itself, which (E3P4) is absurd. Therefore nothing positive in a false idea, etc. Q.E.D.