E4Cap31
Chapter — Part IV
Latin
At superstitio id contra videtur statuere bonum esse quod tristitiam et id contra malum quod lætitiam affert. Sed ut jam diximus (vide scholium propositionis 45 partis IV) nemo nisi invidus mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur. Nam quo majore lætitia afficimur, eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus et consequenter eo magis de natura divina participamus nec lætitia unquam mala esse potest quam nostræ utilitatis vera ratio moderatur. At qui contra metu ducitur et bonum ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur.
English (Elwes 1883)
Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.
Modern English
Superstition, by contrast, appears to hold that what brings sadness is good and what brings joy is bad. But as we have already said (E4P45S): no one but the envious takes pleasure in my impotence and misfortune. The greater the joy we experience, the greater the perfection we pass to, and consequently the more we share in divine nature. Joy, then, can never be bad when it is regulated by our genuine concern for our own advantage. But one who is led by fear and does good only to avoid bad does not act from reason.