E3P3S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Videmus itaque passiones ad mentem non referri nisi quatenus aliquid habet quod negationem involvit sive quatenus consideratur ut naturæ pars quæ per se absque aliis non potest clare et distincte percipi et hac ratione ostendere possem passiones eodem modo ad res singulares ac ad mentem referri nec alia ratione posse percipi sed meum institutum est de sola mente humana agere.
English (Elwes 1883)
Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.
Modern English
We see, then, that passions are attributed to the mind only insofar as the mind contains something that involves negation, that is, only insofar as the mind is considered as a part of nature that cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts. On the same basis I could show that passions are attributed to individual things in the same way they are attributed to the mind, and cannot be perceived otherwise. But my aim is to treat of the human mind alone.