E3P15S
Scholium — Part III
Latin
Hinc intelligimus qui fieri potest ut quædam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita sed tantum ex sympathia (ut aiunt) et antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea objecta quæ nos lætitia vel tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo quod aliquid simile habent objectis quæ nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent ut in sequentibus propositionibus ostendam. Scio equidem auctores qui primi hæc nomina sympathiæ et antipathiæ introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates sed nihilominus credo nobis licere per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.
English (Elwes 1883)
Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us; merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.
Modern English
From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate certain things without any known cause, what people call sympathy and antipathy. To the same category belong objects that affect us with joy or sadness simply because they resemble other objects that usually affect us with those same affects, as I will show in the propositions that follow.
I am aware that the writers who first introduced the terms sympathy and antipathy meant by them certain occult qualities in things. But I think we may be permitted to understand by those terms qualities that are known and manifest.