E3DA31
Definition of an Emotion — Part III
Latin
Pudor est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus actionis quam alios vituperare imaginamur.
Explicatio: De his vide scholium propositionis 30 hujus partis. Sed hic notanda est differentia quæ est inter pudorem et verecundiam. Est enim pudor tristitia quæ sequitur factum cujus pudet. Verecundia autem metus seu timor pudoris quo homo continetur ne aliquid turpe committat. Verecundiæ opponi solet impudentia, quæ revera affectus non est ut suo loco ostendam sed affectuum nomina (ut jam monui) magis eorum usum quam naturam respiciunt. Atque his lætitiæ et tristitiæ affectus quos explicare proposueram, absolvi. Pergo itaque ad illos quos ad cupiditatem refero.
English (Elwes 1883)
Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
Explanation: On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.
I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of those which I refer to desire.
Modern English
Shame is sadness accompanied by the idea of some action of ours that we imagine others blame. See the scholium of Proposition 30 of this Part (E3P30S).
Explanation: The difference between shame and modesty (*verecundia*) is worth noting here. Shame is the sadness that follows an act one is ashamed of. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame that keeps a person from doing something base. Modesty is commonly opposed to shamelessness (*impudentia*), but shamelessness is not really an affect, as I will show in the proper place. I should note, as I have already remarked, that affect-names tend to reflect their exercise rather than their nature.
With this I conclude the affects of joy and sadness that I set out to explain, and I now proceed to those I refer to desire.