E3DA28
Definition of an Emotion — Part III
Latin
Superbia est de se præ amore sui plus justo sentire.
Explicatio: Differt igitur superbia ab existimatione quod hæc ad objectum externum, superbia autem ad ipsum hominem de se plus justo sentientem referatur. Cæterum ut existimatio amoris sic superbia philautiæ effectus vel proprietas est, quæ propterea etiam definiri potest quod sit amor sui sive acquiescentia in se ipso quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de se plus justo sentiat (vide scholium propositionis 26 hujus). Huic affectui non datur contrarius. Nam nemo de se præ odio sui minus justo sentit; imo nemo de se minus justo sentit quatenus imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse. Nam quicquid homo imaginatur se non posse, id necessario imaginatur et hac imaginatione ita disponitur ut id agere revera non possit quod se non posse imaginatur. Quamdiu enim imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse tamdiu ad agendum non est determinatus et consequenter tamdiu impossibile ei est ut id agat. Verumenimvero si ad illa attendamus quæ a sola opinione pendent, concipere poterimus fieri posse ut homo de se minus justo sentiat; fieri enim potest ut aliquis dum tristis imbecillitatem contemplatur suam, imaginetur se ab omnibus contemni idque dum reliqui nihil minus cogitant quam ipsum contemnere. Potest præterea homo de se minus justo sentire si aliquid de se in præsenti neget cum relatione ad futurum tempus cujus est incertus; ut quod neget se nihil certi posse concipere nihilque nisi prava vel turpia posse cupere vel agere etc. Possumus deinde dicere aliquem de se minus justo sentire cum videmus ipsum ex nimio pudoris metu ea non audere quæ alii ipsi æquales audent. Hunc igitur affectum possumus superbiæ opponere quem abjectionem vocabo nam ut ex acquiescentia in se ipso superbia, sic ex humilitate abjectio oritur quæ proinde a nobis sic definitur.
English (Elwes 1883)
Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from self--love.
Explanation: Thus pride is different from partiality, for the latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred; I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals, venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self--abasement, for as from self--complacency springs pride, so from humility springs self--abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
Modern English
Pride is thinking more highly of oneself than is warranted, out of self-love.
Explanation: Pride differs from partiality (*existimatio*) in that partiality concerns an external object, while pride concerns the person who thinks too highly of himself. Just as partiality is an effect of love, pride is an effect or property of self-love (*philautia*), which may therefore also be defined as self-love or self-satisfaction insofar as it so affects a person that he thinks more highly of himself than is warranted. See the scholium of Proposition 26 of this Part (E3P26S).
Pride has no contrary. No one thinks too meanly of himself out of self-hatred. Nor does anyone think too meanly of himself insofar as he imagines himself incapable of this or that. For whatever a person imagines himself unable to do, he necessarily imagines, and by that very imagination is so disposed that he really cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. As long as he imagines he cannot do it, he is not determined to act, and consequently it remains impossible for him.
If, however, we attend to things that depend on opinion alone, we can conceive it possible for a person to think too meanly of himself. For it can happen that someone, in a state of sadness contemplating his own weakness, imagines that everyone holds him in contempt, while the others are thinking nothing of the sort. It is also possible to think too meanly of oneself by denying of oneself in the present something in relation to a future time about which one is uncertain: for example, saying that one can form no clear conception, that one can desire or do nothing but what is wrong or base, and the like. We may also say that someone thinks too meanly of himself when we see him, out of excessive fear of shame, not venturing what others his equal do venture.
We can therefore set this affect in opposition to pride and call it self-abasement (*abjectio*). For as pride springs from self-satisfaction, self-abasement springs from humility, and it is accordingly defined by us as follows.