E2P48S
Scholium — Part II
Latin
Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc. Unde sequitur has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias vel nihil esse præter entia metaphysica vel universalia quæ ex particularibus formare solemus. Adeo ut intellectus et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem cur homines se liberos esse putent explicuimus in appendice partis primæ. Verum antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem inquam intelligo qua mens quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat et non cupiditatem qua mens res appetit vel aversatur. At postquam demonstravimus has facultates notiones esse universales quæ a singularibus ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum jam est an ipsæ volitiones aliquid sint præter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum inquam est an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur præter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide sequentem propositionem ut et demonstrationem 3 hujus ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines quales in fundo oculi et si placet, in medio cerebro formantur sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.
English (Elwes 1883)
In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
Modern English
In the same way it is demonstrated that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, and the like. From this it follows that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious or are nothing but metaphysical or universal entities, the kind we customarily form from particular things. The intellect and the will, then, stand to this or that idea and this or that volition as stoneness stands to this or that stone, or as man stands to Peter and Paul.
The reason men believe themselves to be free I explained in the Appendix to Part 1. But before I go further, I should note here that by will I mean the faculty of affirming and denying, not desire. I mean the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire by which the mind seeks or avoids things. Once we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions not distinguishable from the particulars from which we form them, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything beyond the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether in the mind there is any affirmation or negation beyond that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. On this see the next proposition, and also D3 of this Part, lest thought collapse into pictures. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the middle of the brain; I mean conceptions of thought.